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Abstract 
The publication presents the results of the research project “Religious Denominations in 
Vienna & Austria: Baseline study for 2016 – Scenarios until 2046” conducted by the 
Vienna Institute of Demography of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. The aim of this 
study project was twofold: Firstly, to estimate the religious composition of the population 
of Austria and Vienna in 2016 taking into account the most recent migration movements; 
and secondly, to project the population of Austria and Vienna from 2016 to 2046 based on 
several scenarios related mostly to the three major forces affecting religious composition, 
migration (including asylum-seekers), differential fertility, and religious conversion. 
While the projections demonstrate some of the possible futures that Austria and its capital 
city could experience in the coming decades, and those are all quite dissimilar, they also 
show that religious diversity is bound to increase, and there are no reasons to think that 
any of the trends that have been in place already for several decades in the country will 
stop and that the country would move back to the situation of the early 1970s.  
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Religious Denominations in Vienna & Austria: 
 Baseline Study for 2016 - Scenarios until 2046 
 
Anne Goujon, Sandra Jurasszovich, Michaela Potančoková 
 
1. Summary 
The publication at hand presents the results of the research project “Religious 
Denominations in Vienna & Austria: Baseline study for 2016 – Scenarios until 2046” 
conducted by the Vienna Institute of Demography of the Austrian Academy of Sciences 
and with financial support by the Austrian Integration Fund. 
The research interest of the project is to analyse, by means of rigorous scientific 
methods, some exploratory scenarios concerning the religious distribution of the Austrian 
population and its capital Vienna for the next 30 years. The findings of this study provide 
meaningful insights that help detect changes early on and form the basis for policies 
aiming to foster the coexistence of all parts of the Austrian population. Using scenarios as 
an empirical-analytical method is not about making forecasts or predictions, but rather 
serves as a planning technique. This method involves sketching drafts of futures that are 
possible, but not necessarily definite. In this project, four scenarios were built that show 
how the religious distribution of Austria’s population could look like in the near to 
medium-term future as certain variables move into different directions. 
The aim of this study project is twofold:  
- Firstly, to estimate the religious composition of the population of Austria and 
Vienna in 2016 taking into account the most recent migration movements. 
- Secondly, to project the population of Austria and Vienna from 2016 to 2046 based 
on several scenarios related mostly to the three major forces affecting religious 
composition, migration (including asylum-seekers), differential fertility, and 
religious conversion.  
 
The methodological procedure and data constraints are explained in detail in the 
chapters 1.2 Why is it important? and 1.3 Filling the gap. 
 
1.1. Change of Religious Landscape of Austria and Vienna 
Austria used to be – and still is – predominantly Roman Catholic, though several religious 
minorities, in particular Protestant and Jewish communities, have existed there for a 
number of centuries. Until recently, most changes in the religious landscape of Austria 
were caused by the enforcement of doctrines by the religious authorities, e.g. the Counter-
Reformation in the seventeenth century and/or by the political power in place, for 
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example, the pogroms and ensuing holocaust of Jewish communities under the Nazi-
Regime. 
 
Since 1970 the relative religious homogeneity of the Austrian population has been 
slowly changing into a more diversified religious landscape through two main forces: The 
first one – also historically – is that of secularisation. As an effect of modernization and 
rationalization, religion gradually lost the overarching importance in people’s lives, and 
religion, while still part of the cultural identity of most, has become more of an individual 
characteristic. The second main trend is the increased religious diversity shaped by 
migration. Migration to Austria has increased for several reasons: firstly, because of 
economic factors demanding the increase/supplementation of the labour force, for 
instance with the Gastarbeiter program, and crises in neighbouring countries such as the 
Yugoslavian war and the break of the Berlin Wall. More recently, the war that erupted in 
2011 in Syria caused the displacement of populations who flew to neighbouring countries 
and to Europe. Other conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Eritrea, and dire poverty in further 
countries lead more people to look for living options elsewhere. In 2015, Austria 
registered more than 88,000 asylum applications – 10.3 per 1,000 residents (Migration 
Policy Institute Data Hub based on Eurostat).  
In the past 30 years, the people in the several migration movements to Austria brought 
with them religious traditions that had been scarce in the population, particularly Islam 
and Orthodox Christianity. As a result, religious diversity has increased.  
Both trends of secularisation and religious diversification that we are observing 
nowadays are unpreceded in the recent history of Austria as well as of most European 
countries and are shaping the religious landscape of Austria today. They are quantifiable, 
as data are available to estimate the number of individuals in several large religious 
categories. Data also permit to assess the demographic behaviours – in terms of fertility, 
mortality and migration – of the different religious groups, allowing us to project the 
religious composition according to scenarios/narratives about what possible future 
development/trends might be. The work presented in this report aims at quantifying the 
share of the main religious affiliations in Austria in 2016 and, based on several scenarios, 
seeks to derive potential middle-term futures for Austria and its capital Vienna. 
  
1.2. Why is it Important? 
The relevance of scientific knowledge on a population's religious composition is essential 
to understand the challenges faced by societies today. Quantifying Austria’s and Vienna’s 
religious landscapes is not about setting a benchmark about a certain level of religious 
diversity deemed acceptable or threatening, but rather about testing what level of 
religious diversity can be expected when different stories are followed. The research 
presented here has preparatory benefits as projections are important to reduce the 
uncertainties about future developments of religious diversity and, if necessary, to take 
decisions more rationally (see e.g. Fassmann 2002). The work presented in this report, 
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while sometimes using approximations due to incomplete or unavailable data, follows a 
scientifically rigorous approach.  
 
1.3. Filling the Gap 
Since 2001, the year of the last census that collected information on religious affiliation of 
the population, there have been no further data available on the religious distribution of 
Austria’s population. In 2011, Austria moved to a complete register-based census, not 
releasing data on religious affiliation. Data on religious affiliation is collected in the ZMR 
(Zentrales Melderegister). However filling one’s religion in the Meldezettel is not 
compulsory. We therefore need to estimate the most recent state of religious composition 
of Austria and Vienna. For this purpose, we reconstruct the 2016 population, applying 
population projection techniques and using the information collected in the 2001 census 
as our basis, and taking into account components of population change, namely 
migration, fertility, mortality, and religious mobility between 2001 and 2015. As 
mentioned, data on religion are not always available; thus the 2016 religious composition 
relies on estimates using scientifically sound techniques. For instance, religious identity of 
migrants is not documented and we have to assume that their religious composition is the 
same as that of the people residing in their country of birth or citizenship. This approach 
is known as the random migrant assumption and is commonly used in migration studies.  
In recent years, the changing patterns of migration flows also had an impact on the 
religious composition of immigrants to Austria: In the 2000s, the main countries of origin 
were Germany and Eastern European countries, i.e. countries with predominantly 
Christian populations. Although there have been Muslim immigrants before – especially 
from Turkey – a significant change in the patterns of migration flows took place in the 
period from 2011 to 2015 with more migrants from the Syrian Arab Republic and 
Afghanistan, both countries with overwhelmingly Muslim populations, coming to Austria 
and joining the top-ten list of countries of origin for the first time. Data and methods will 
be described in more detail in the chapter 3. Part I: Reconstruction of the religious composition 
in 2016.  
In this research project we focused on six religious affiliations: Roman Catholics, 
Protestants, Muslims, Orthodox, other religions, and unaffiliated, i.e. persons with no 
stated religion1. This report does not address the issue of religious intensity, but purely 
focuses on the quantification of the group size and demographic behaviour of the 
different religious affiliations. While religious intensity is surely an important dimension, 
it is difficult to project as it is rather volatile and context-based.  
The reconstructed population of 2016 by religion shows that the religious 
composition of the Austrian population has changed noticeably since the last 
1 While we were able to distinguish between several Christian affiliations (Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox), 
data do not allow splitting the Muslim group into denominations such as Sunni and Shia Islam for instance. 
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measurement in 2001 (see Figure A). The secularisation trend continued and the share of 
the Roman Catholics has declined further from 3/4 of the population in 2001 to 2/3 in 2016. 
The largest gains were among the population without religion, which accounts for 17% of 
the population in 2016 compared to 12% in 2001. The Orthodox and Muslim communities 
have also grown substantially. The share of Orthodox has more than doubled from 2% to 
5%, and the Muslims have increased their share from 4% to 8% between 2001 and 2016. 
The relative share of Protestants and other religions did not change.  
 
Figure A: Religious distribution of Austria`s population in 2001 (census) and 2016 
(estimated) 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
 
Vienna, as most European capitals, is at the forefront of both secularisation and the 
growing visibility of minorities/new religions in the public space. Hence, already in 2001, 
larger proportions of its population had a non-Christian affiliation (15% compared to 5% 
in Austria), and more residents reported having no religious affiliation (26% compared to 
12% in Austria). As shown in Figure B, the change in the following 15 years is similarly 
impressive in the city of Vienna as it is in Austria: the share of Roman Catholics has 
further dropped to 35% in 2016 (from 49% in 2001). Simultaneously, the share of the 
unaffiliated reached 30% in 2016, having increased by mere 4 percentage points since 2001 
(26%). Migration became the main driver for transforming the religious landscape of 
Vienna in this period. The share of Muslims increased most rapidly with 14% in 2016 
(from 8% in 2001), followed by the Orthodox, whose proportion rose from 6% in 2001 to 
10% in 2016. 
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Figure B: Religious distribution of Vienna’s population in 2001 (census) and 2016 
(reconstruction) 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
1.4. What if…Scenarios for the Future 
In a second step of this project, four scenarios of possible developments were outlined to 
project the population of Austria and Vienna from 2016 to 2046. Scenario methods are 
often used to sketch out alternative developments and to enable anticipatory planning. It 
is important to emphasise that scenarios are not to be viewed as forecasts, but rather as a 
means to answer various hypothetical questions. By identifying the main drivers of 
change and critical uncertainties, different paths can be derived which would occur as the 
key factors move into different directions. This form of analysis does not project a linear 
future, but rather multiple futures, in order to broaden the perspective on possible trends 
and to adapt and respond to changes early on. 
Starting point of a scenario analysis is the formulation of narratives of possible futures 
that are then translated into scenario assumptions. In this study project analysing the 
religious composition of the Austrian and Viennese population from 2016 to 2046, we 
made the following assumptions: 
- volume and composition of migrants,  
- differences in the fertility (foreseen changes in family size) of women depending 
on their religious affiliation and  
- secularisation patterns.  
All these dimensions were quantified in order to project possible future size and 
religious composition of Austria’s and Vienna’s population. International migration is the 
principal driver of religious diversity in all scenarios. The four migration scenarios vary 
on a scale from closed borders and restrictive policies to open borders and high 
immigration, including two scenarios that build upon the most recent migration trends.  
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Estimating future migration often appears to be challenging as the flows are sensitive 
to a range of factors such as government policies, economic conditions and international 
crises. The overall migration figures (number of immigrants and emigrants per year) of 
the scenarios are aligned to the scenarios of Statistik Austria’s population projections 
(Statistik Austria 2016). We derived the religious composition of the migrants based on 
the population’s religious distribution in their respective country of birth. At the same 
time migration usually happens along pre-established links and networks between 
sending and receiving countries that are often quite stable. Other assumptions in the 
scenarios concerning fertility and secularisation follow from the migration narrative. In 
the example of the high migration scenario, we assume high fertility – most additional 
migrants would come from the Middle East and North Africa region and from Sub-
Saharan Africa, where numbers of children are higher than in Austria. Moreover, recent 
immigrants usually have high fertility in the first years after migration because they were 
postponing their plans during the migration process. High immigration assumptions also 
translate into expectations of low secularisation rates supposing that intense religious 
diversification would steer individuals to be more attached to their religious 
characteristics as part of their identity. For a more detailed explanation of how scenarios 
were formulated, what methods were employed, as well as on the data used, we refer the 
reader to the chapter 4. Part II: The religious composition in 2046 across different scenarios of 
this report.  
 
1.5. Results 
The projections demonstrate some of the possible futures that Austria and its capital city 
may experience in the coming decades and they also show that religious homogeneity 
will further diminish. In our projections for Austria we find that the share of Roman 
Catholics would fall below 50% by 2046. However, in all scenarios presented in this 
project the Roman Catholic community would still be the largest religious group in 
Austria, accounting for 42 to 47% depending on the scenario. The share of the Protestants 
would remain relatively stable over the period with around 4-5%. The projections also 
show an increase in the share of the Orthodox community to around 6-9%. The group of 
the religiously unaffiliated would increase its weight in the Austrian population, within a 
range from 21 to 28% by 2046, depending on the scenario. The Muslim population has 
already experienced a sharp increase, from around 1% in 1981 to 8% in 2016, and by 2046 
would represent 12% to 21% of the population. Another interesting aspect is that the share 
of other religions is estimated to remain at the same level as in 2016 (about 2%) across all 
four scenarios. This is the result of the scenario assumptions envisaging mainly the 
diversification of religions in Austria to occur through the expansion of already 
established religious communities such as Orthodox and Muslims, coming from a set of 
presently sending countries.  
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Figure C: Religious distribution of Austria’s population in 2016 (reconstruction) and in 
2046 across the different scenarios  
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
Somewhat different frame conditions can be observed in Vienna – as Austria’s single 
metropolis – where both forces of secularisation and migration are more strongly 
pronounced than in any of the other Austrian federal States. While from 1971 to 2001, the 
share of Roman Catholics decreased from 87% to 74% in Austria as a whole, it dropped 
from 78% to 49% in Vienna. During the same period, the share of those without religious 
affiliation rose from 4% to 12% in Austria and from 10% to 26% in Vienna. Whereas the 
share of people without religion was estimated to have further increased to around 30% in 
2016, for the future, three out of the four scenario calculations show that this share would 
remain relatively stable with 28-31%. This can be explained by the saturation of 
secularisation trends, meaning that secularisation affects mostly those who are loosely 
religious whereas the more religious – and their children – are less likely to secularise. 
Nevertheless, in those three scenarios the secularised population would be the largest 
religious group by the middle of the 21st century in Vienna. Only in the scenario High 
immigration with low secularisation tendency the group of the unaffiliated would decrease 
more strongly to 24%. The decline in the share of the Roman Catholics, which was 
observed in the past, would continue in the future and drop to about 22-26%. On the 
contrary, communities of Muslims (20-30% in 2046) and of the Orthodox (12%-16% in 
2046) are projected to increase further.   
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Figure D: Religious distribution of Vienna’s population in 2016 (reconstruction) and in 
2046 across the different scenarios  
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
In the section below we summarise the narratives, assumptions and the main results 
for both Austria and Vienna for the four scenarios: European mobility, Diversity, Low 
immigration and High immigration. 
 
1.5.1. European Mobility Scenario 
This scenario refers to a situation where migration flows would be mostly composed of 
migrants from Europe and the European Union as it was observed in Austria between 
2006 and 2010. Together with the scenario Diversity it represents a medium variant that 
corresponds to the trend scenario of Statistics Austria population projections regarding 
the volume of migration – with around 175 to 145 thousands of international immigrants 
arriving yearly over the period 2016-2045 (compared to 214 thousands in 2015). This 
middle-of-the-road scenario for migration is combined with medium secularisation and 
medium fertility assumptions. The latter means that fertility rates between the religious 
groups would converge over time. Medium secularisation means that secularisation rates 
would remain constant at the observed level in the base year over the first ten years and 
decline slowly in the last period of the projections. This scenario would result in a 
population of 9.7 million inhabitants in 2046 in Austria, and 2.2 million residing in 
Vienna. 
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For Austria, the religiously unaffiliated group would grow the most and would compose 
25% of population in 2046, up from 17% in 2016. In parallel, the share of Roman Catholics 
would decline from 64% to 45% within the next three decades. The proportions of 
Orthodox would expand from 5% in 2016 to 9% in 2046, and that of the Muslims from 8% 
to 14%. 
In contrast to the results for Austria, the share of the unaffiliated in Vienna is projected 
to slightly decline from 30% in 2016 to 29% in 2046 as a result of both negative net 
migration of the unaffiliated (due to internal migration patterns in which more 
unaffiliated leave the city than move in), and the saturation of secularisation potential. 
Nevertheless, the group of the unaffiliated would represent the largest group in the 
spectrum of religious denominations in Vienna by 2046. Similarly to Austria as a whole, 
the Roman Catholics are projected to show the largest proportional decrease from 35% in 
2016 to 24% in 2046. For Vienna, the largest proportional increase is projected for Muslims 
(from 14% in 2016 to 21% in 2046), followed by the Orthodox (from 10% in 2016 to 16% in 
2046). 
 
1.5.2. Diversity Scenario 
In contrast to the previous European mobility scenario, the Diversity scenario takes into 
account the more recent trends of migration patterns (from 2011 onwards) that are 
characterised by a stronger non-European component as countries such as Afghanistan, 
Syria, Iran and Iraq are among the most prominent countries sending migrants to Austria. 
Just as scenario European mobility, this scenario also assumes medium migration, 
secularisation and fertility and leads to similar results in terms of population size. 
For Austria, the Muslim community would experience the greatest gains as their share 
would rise from 8% in 2016 to 17% in 2046 (for comparison: 14% under the European 
mobility scenario), followed by the group of the religiously unaffiliated (from 17% in 2016 
to 24% in 2046). Similarly to scenario European mobility, the share of Roman Catholics is 
projected to decline strongly from 64% in 2046 to 45% in 2046.  
This scenario is particularly interesting in the sense that it shows the sensitivity of the 
projections to migration, especially the effect of the reference period on which the 
projected migration trends are based. This can also be observed for Vienna. When we take 
into consideration the trend that was observed in the last five years – with a large share of 
migrants arriving from countries outside of the EU – we see that the shares of the Roman 
Catholics and the unaffiliated are not much affected when comparing it with the results of 
scenario European mobility. The share of the Viennese population with a Muslim affiliation 
however changes considerably: 23% in 2046 compared to 21% in scenario European 
Mobility, and to 14% in 2016.  
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1.5.3. Low Immigration Scenario 
The Low immigration scenario is based on the idea that international migration comes to a 
halt by 2021 with Austria sealing its border to EU and non-EU citizens. Such an extreme 
scenario means that future changes in the religious landscape would be foremost 
attributable to religious mobility and fertility assumptions. This scenario assumes a high 
secularisation rate following the present trend as religion becomes more and more an 
individual characteristic with little visibility in the public sphere. It also assumes that 
compared to the other scenarios the fertility of migrants would converge rapidly to the 
lower levels of Austrian women. 
In comparison with the religious distribution of Austria’s population in 2016, the 
unaffiliated would experience the highest proportional increase (from 17% in 2016 to 28% 
in 2046), while the strongest decrease is projected for the Roman Catholics (from 64% to 
47%). In comparison with the other scenarios, this scenario features on one hand the 
lowest decline in the share of Roman Catholics and on the other hand the lowest increase 
of population with a Muslim or Orthodox affiliation. Overall, population growth would 
be meagre as the population would peak in 2026 with 8.9 million and would start 
declining thereafter to 8.5 million in 2046. 
The Low immigration scenario would lead to less migration to Vienna as well, and 
consequently the religious composition of the Viennese population would be the closest to 
the one in 2016 compared to other scenarios. The secularisation trend would still affect the 
Roman Catholic group, which would further decline from 35% in 2016 to 26% in 2046. The 
group of the unaffiliated would slightly increase from 30% to 31%. This scenario shows 
the smallest increase of the Muslim community with 20% in 2046 compared to 14% in 
2016 as well as the smallest increase of the Orthodox community with 12% of the 
Viennese population in 2046 compared to 10% in 2016). As for the Austrian population, 
the capital city’s population would peak in 2026 with 1.9 million and slowly decline to 1.8 
million by 2046. 
 
1.5.4. High Immigration Scenario 
The High immigration scenario imagines a future of sustained open door policy toward 
immigrants. In this case Austria would welcome large numbers of migrants, especially 
from Middle East and North African (MENA) and sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. 
In this scenario the higher levels of religiosity would result in a decline of secularisation 
rates: We assume that religious identity would become increasingly important within the 
religiously diversified society. Due to increased immigration from high-fertility countries 
and the fact that new immigrants tend to bring their family ideals along (and these change 
at the earliest in next generations), the fertility of the most fertile religious groups, 
Muslims, would decline only slowly.  
Under these assumptions, Austria would see a rapid increase of its population (to 10.5 
million in 2046) and of its Muslim population in particular, as the share of Muslims 
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increases strongly from 8% in 2016 to 21% in 2046 – the highest increase across the four 
scenarios. The reasons lie in the positive net-migration and the relatively high fertility – 
above 2 children per Muslim woman while other religious groups would have a much 
lower fertility around 1.5 children. In contrast, this scenario shows the strongest decrease 
of the share of Roman Catholics, which would decline from 64% in 2016 to 42% in 2046. 
Vienna, the city attracting the most international migrants coming to Austria, would – 
similarly to Austria as a whole – see the strongest increase in the share of Muslim 
population across the four scenarios: The share of Muslims is projected to increase from 
14% in 2016 to 30% and would Muslims would thus be the largest religious group by the 
middle of the century in Vienna in this scenario. Notable is also the rather strong decline 
in the share of the population without religion (from 30% in 2016 to 24% in 2046) due to 
assumed low secularisation rates. Vienna’s population would count as many as 2.4 
million inhabitants in 2046. 
 
1.6. Conclusion 
All scenarios envisaged lead to increased religious diversity. One direct implication seems 
to be that the co-existence of the different religious groups will require the attention of 
stakeholders, both at the national, but even more at the capital city level. In the public 
debate, religious diversity is often considered as a constraint for the peaceful coexistence 
of, and dialogue among, different communities and social groups, particularly if 
secularism is seen as one of the core values and rules of conduct in European societies, 
with religion broadly perceived as private. This view is challenged by the presence of 
visible religious minorities that is often seen as a threat to Europe's secular values and 
immigrants' non-traditional religiosity as an obstacle to integration, although this does not 
necessarily have to be the case. 
It is important to note that the growth of minority religions is not solely driven by the 
factor of immigration but also by the relatively strong demographic momentum of 
particular migrant groups with youthful age structures and high fertility rates. It should 
be mentioned that differences in demographic behaviour are not solely about religion. 
Especially socio-economic characteristics such as educational attainment or female labor 
force participation explain most of the differences in fertility between religious groups. 
Furthermore, immigrant generation and country of origin play a big role. The fertility of 
Muslim women in Austria is high because many have low education and come from 
countries with higher fertility ideals. However, those Muslim women who are highly 
educated have similar fertility outcomes as highly educated Roman Catholic women in 
Austria. 
The Austrian situation and that of its capital city is not unique in Europe and most 
Western European countries are going through similar experiences. The polarizing trends 
of increased religious pluralism and religiosity on the one side and ongoing secularisation 
on the other side are shaping the diverse religious landscape of Europe, as well as the 
global environment in terms of national policies and international settings.  
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2. Introduction 
Since 1970 the overall religious homogeneity of the Austrian population has been slowly 
changing to a more diversified religious landscape through two main forces: increased 
secularisation and immigration of people belonging to other religions. Moreover, migrant 
women of the first generation overall had a higher number of children compared to native 
women, which has been reinforcing the increase in religious pluralism due to migration.  
2001 is the last year for which data on the religious denomination of the population in 
Austria was collected as part of the population census. For later years we have to solely 
rely on projections. Early projections by Goujon et al. (2007) estimated that, according to a 
medium scenario, in 2016 the population of Austria would be composed of 64% of Roman 
Catholics (compared to 74% in 2001), 17% of people without religion (12% in 2001), 8% of 
Muslims (4% in 2001), and 7% with another religion (5% in 2001). This previous research 
endeavour projected a population of 650,000 Muslims in 2016 in Austria. This research 
project, however, did not yet take into account the latest trends we observed in recent 
years.  In particular it did not take into account the arrival of substantial numbers of 
persons seeking asylum in Austria in 2015 and 2016, mostly originating from 
predominantly Muslim countries such as Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan. The country 
received some 88,300 new asylum applications in 2015 (Federal Ministry of the Interior), a 
threefold increase over the previous year. In 2016, authorities have limited the number of 
asylum applications, which still remained at a high level with over 40,000 new asylum 
applications in total. 
Overall, the relative sizes of secular and religious populations belong to the most 
important social characteristics of any society. In the wake of religious change, family 
behaviour, including marriage and childbearing, is likely to be altered. European 
demographic trends, characterised by low fertility and progressively later childbearing, 
are also likely to be affected when there is a growth of distinct religious groups with high 
fertility and with low rates of conversion and/or secularisation. The changing religious 
distribution of the population can also have wider social and political ramifications, 
affecting the level of social cohesion, societal trust and social/political dynamics.  
 
2.1. Objective & Purpose 
The aim of this study is two-fold:  
- Firstly, to estimate the religious composition of the population of Austria and 
Vienna in 2016 taking into account the most recent migration movements. The 
estimate relies on the data on population by religion collected in the 2001 census – 
the last year for which data on the religious denomination of the population in 
Austria was collected – and information about the different components of change 
(fertility, mortality, migration, and religious switching) between 2001 and 2015. 
This is termed reconstruction throughout this report. 
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- Secondly, to project the population of Austria and Vienna from 2016 to 2046 based 
on several scenarios related mostly to the three major forces affecting religious 
composition, namely migration (including asylum-seekers), differential fertility, 
and religious conversion.  
 
We consider six religious affiliations2 in the population: Roman Catholics (CAT), 
Protestants (PRO), Muslims (MUS), Orthodox (ORT), other religions (OTH), and no 
religion3 (NOR). This report does not address the issue of religiosity. It purely focuses on 
the quantification of the size and demographic behaviour of the different religious 
affiliations. While religious intensity might differ between religious groups, we do not 
consider this in this present work as the projections are based on census data which 
includes religious affiliation but not religious intensity. 
 
 
2.2. Background on the Change of Religious Landscape of Austria and Vienna and 
Migration Patterns4 
Austria used to be – and still remains – predominantly Roman Catholic, though several 
religious minorities, in particular Protestant and Jewish communities, have existed there 
for a number of centuries. Until recently, most changes in the religious landscape of 
Austria were caused by the enforcement of doctrines by the religious authorities, e.g. the 
Counter-Reformation in the seventeenth century and/or by the political power in place, 
for example, the pogroms and ensuing holocaust of Jewish communities under the Nazi-
Regime. 
Since 1970, the relative homogeneity in terms of the domination of one religious group 
in the population (the Roman Catholic Church) has been slowly fading away because of 
two main forces: increased secularisation and immigration of people belonging to other 
religions (Goujon et al. 2007). Migrant women, especially from Turkey, Serbia and 
Montenegro, and Macedonia tend to have a higher number of children compared to 
native women, which has been reinforcing the increase in religious pluralism. These 
developments lead to the diversification of the religious landscape in Austria and have 
been exacerbated in the city of Vienna, where both forces of secularisation and migration 
2 While we were able to distinguish between several Christian affiliations (Catholic, Protestant and Orthodox), 
data do not allow splitting the Muslim group into denominations such as Sunni and Shia Islam for instance. 
3 Throughout the paper, we either use the terms unaffiliated, secular, no religion, none or without religion to refer 
to the group of people who report having no religious affiliation, as measured in the 2001 census. This group 
is heterogeneous as it consists mostly of people who do not have a religion (atheists, agnostics), and people 
who moved out of the main Christian Churches by conviction or because they did not want to pay their dues. 
It is also important to note that for some religions, such as Islam and the Orthodox Church, there is a paucity 
of information on people leaving their affiliation. Moreover, formal apostasy from Islam is difficult and rarely 
practiced. Hence, interpretation about the number/share of the population belonging to this group should be 
taken with utmost caution.  
4 This section is largely based on Goujon and Bauer (2015). 
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are stronger than in any of the other Austrian Federal Provinces. Whereas the share of 
Roman Catholics decreased from 87% (1971) to 74% (2001) in the whole country, it 
changed from 78% (1971) to 49% (2001) in Vienna. During the same period, the share of 
those without any religious affiliation rose from 4 to 12% in Austria and from 10 to 26% in 
Vienna. The share of the Muslim community rose from being close to 0% in 1971 at the 
national as well as capital city level to 4% in Austria and 8 % in Vienna in 2001. 
Approximately half of the Muslims living in Vienna were born in Turkey, 30% were 
actually born in Austria and 18 % in former Yugoslavia.  
Vienna is home to 20% of the Austrian population, but hosts a larger share of the 
population with a migratory background with 40%, whereby three quarters of those are 
migrants of the first generation.  
There are several phases in the diversification of the religious landscape of Austria and 
Vienna. Until 1974, it occurred mostly through the arrival of guest workers mainly from 
Yugoslavia and Turkey. This was followed by a period of low to negative net-migration 
from 1975 to 1986. Net migration started increasing again after 1986, escalating with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the war in Yugoslavia. After a dip between 1994 and 1999, 
migration flows started increasing again between 2000 and 2005, with the majority of 
migrants coming from former Yugoslavian countries and Turkey. The accession of ten 
Eastern European countries to the EU in 2004 once again altered the composition of 
migrants to Austria in the following years. Between 2006 and 2009, net migration was 
lower as compared to the previous period, composed mostly of EU citizens with about 2/3 
coming from Germany, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, and Hungary. The last 
period is dominated by a revival in migration particularly since 2015. 
Along with the falling numbers of religiously affiliated people, a dimension we are 
measuring in this report, religiosity has declined and altered its faces. Alongside 
decreasing church attendance, individual beliefs such as the belief in God or self-assessed 
religiosity have weakened as well. During the last decade they have decreased most 
notably among young people and in rural areas, where they used to be very present 
(Zulehner and Polak 2009). Religious socialization in the family, an important 
precondition for future faith, is less common at present than 20 years ago. Baptism, a 
religious wedding and especially a religious funeral, on the other hand, remain 
widespread. When European countries are ranked by their level of religiosity, Austria is 
located at the lower end of the more religious half of countries, close to, for example, 
Switzerland or Slovenia (Voas 2009 ). In contrast, large numbers of immigrants coming 
from more religious societies alter this trend, and further increase the existing gap 
between the new and traditional religions (Norris and Inglehart 2012). 
 
3. Part I: Reconstruction of the Religious Composition in 2016 
The population of Austria and Vienna is reconstructed through projections starting from 
the last collected data on religious affiliation in the census of 2001. The projections follow 
the demographic methodology of multi-state population projections, a multi-dimensional 
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expansion of the cohort-component projection method. The projections from 2001 to 2016 
require:  
(1) Population by age, sex, and religion in 2001;  
(2) fertility by age and religion from 2001 to 2015;  
(3) mortality by age and sex from 2001 to 2015;  
(4) migration (in- and out-flows) by age, sex, and religion from 2001 to 2015 and 
(5) religious switching (mostly in terms of secularisation) by age and sex from 2001 to 
2015. The reconstruction is carried out in three steps of 5-year periods: 2001-2005, 
2006-2010, 2011-2015. 
 
3.1. Population in 2001 
The populations in 20015 on January 1 by age, sex and 6 religious affiliations are 
represented in Figure 1 for Austria and in Figure 2 for Vienna.  
 
Figure 1: Population pyramid of Austria by religion, 2001 
 Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
 
5 The census was collected as of May 15, 2001 and the population numbers were interpolated as to obtain the 
January 1, 2001 population by religion, age and sex. 
Men Wome
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Figure 2: Population pyramid of Vienna by religion, 2001 
 Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
In Austria, out of the 8 million inhabitants, 6 million were Roman Catholics (75%) and 
close to 1 million were unaffiliated (12%), the rest of the population being distributed 
between Protestants (5%), Muslims (4%), Orthodox (2%) and Other religions (1%). The 
distribution by religious affiliation looks radically different in the population of Vienna, 
where barely half (49%) of the 1.6 million population belonged to the Roman Catholic 
Church and 26% to the unaffiliated group (400,000 people). While the share of Protestants 
does not differ from that in the Austrian population, the other religions tended to have a 
larger weight in the population residing in Vienna: 8% Muslims, 6% Orthodox and 7% 
with another religion.  
The sections below detail the estimates in terms of migration, fertility, secularisation, 
and mortality that enter the reconstruction. 
 
3.2. Migration – Data and Method 
Migration statistics are elaborated by Statistik Austria and comprise data on international 
migration as well as migration within Austria6. Every person who enters or leaves Austria 
6 The terms immigration and emigration are used to refer to population movements between countries 
(international migration). The terms in-migration and out-migration are used to describe population movements 
between areas within Austria (internal migration). 
Men Wome
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or who changes his or her main residence within Austria is obligated to register and 
deregister their main place of residence within three working days after relocation. 
Following the UN definition of short-term migrants (91 days to 12 months), foreign 
nationals are counted as migrants when they have registered a main residence in Austria 
for at least 90 consecutive days (Kytir, Lebhart and Neustädter 2007, p. 284).  
 
Since 2002, migration statistics have been based on administrative registrations and de-
registrations derived from the Central Register of Residence (Zentrales Melderegister 
ZMR) and data are available for immigration and emigration by age, sex and country of 
birth7, as well as Federal States. Based on this, net migration, which is the difference 
of immigrants and emigrants, can be computed for Austria as well as between Vienna and 
the rest of the country. 
Before 2002, data on registrations were contained in local registers, which were 
transmitted individually to Statistik Austria. The transition from the old system to the 
new system invariably led to a break in the time series. The old migration statistics 
displayed a large under-recording of registrations in comparison with the number of 
registrations recorded in the Central Register of Residence. To explain the increase in the 
population, a new migration balance had to be calculated for 2001 (Kytir, Lebhart and 
Neustädter 2007, p. 286). Hence, Statistik Austria provides estimated totals for 
immigration and emigration for Austria for 2001. Drawing on these total numbers, the 
proportional distribution by sex, age and country of birth was estimated based on the year 
2002. In the case of Vienna no estimates were available; therefore the year 2001 is entirely 
based on 2002.  
 
3.2.1. Asylum and Migration Statistics 
In 2015, Austria experienced a high influx of refugees and asylum seekers. According to 
Statistik Austria, persons who seek asylum in Austria are registered with a main 
residence in Austria and thus included in the migration statistics – given they have stayed 
in Austria for at least 90 consecutive days. In other words, first-time asylum applicants8 
who arrived in Austria until the end of September 2015 and did not leave the country 
within  90 consecutive days are counted in the migration statistic. However, those who 
arrived in the last four months of the year – the asylum migration movement of 2015 
peaked in the autumn months – do not yet appear in the migration statistics as they 
7 The attribute country of birth was chosen rather than citizenship as citizenship can be acquired in the years 
following the arrival into the country. First generation immigrants who were socialised in the context of their 
home countries tend to have distinct demographic behaviours and citizenship data would conceal their 
specificities.  
8 A first-time applicant is a person who lodged an application for asylum for the first time in Austria. The 
count of first-time asylum applicants excludes repeat applicants i.e. persons applying for asylum more than 
once in a given country, and therefore more accurately presents the number of newly arrived persons 
applying for asylum in Austria.  
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resided in Austria for less than 90 days. Due to this timeframe as well as delays in 
registering main residence in Austria, asylum and migration statistics show discrepancies, 
leading to an underestimation of newly arrived immigrants in the migration statistics. To 
arrive at a correct estimate of Austria’s population and religious composition at the end of 
2015, we need to take into account the asylum migration and thus look into more detail at 
data retrieved from migration and asylum statistics and at their consistency.9 
In order to address the issue of underestimation of newly arrived asylum seekers in the 
migration statistics, the number of first-time asylum applicants of the last two months in 
2015 was added to the total number of immigrants in the period 2011 to 2015, resulting in 
an increase of some 19,000 persons; this number equates around 2% of the total 
international immigration in this period. It should be kept in mind that this number is a 
proxy without taking into consideration – due to lack of data – approval rates, possible 
onward journey of refugees within the European Union or regular migration that took 
place within a period of less than 90 days in the last months of the year.  
For this project, we used asylum statistics on first-time asylum applicants by sex and 
citizenship published by Eurostat. Asylum statistics only include information about 
citizenship, but not country of birth; we therefore have to assume a correspondence 
between the nationality of the asylum seekers and their country of birth. Among the first-
time asylum seekers who arrived in November and December 2015, about 87% came from 
Afghanistan, Syria, Iraq and Iran. Males accounted for 65% of the total number of first-
time applicants in the two last months of 2015.  
Vienna 
For Vienna, the only available data are on the counts of asylum seekers living in state 
residential accommodation (Fonds Soziales Wien 2016). Therefore, we assumed that 
refugees follow the same pattern as other international immigrants in 2015, when 36% of 
all new migrants coming to Austria from abroad moved to Vienna. The same share is 
applied to the first-time asylum applicants of the last two months of 2015 and added to 
the total number of immigrants in the period 2011-2015. This results in an increase in the 
number of immigrants of some 7,000 persons, corresponding to about 1% of the total 
migration flows towards Vienna in the period 2011-2015.  
 
3.2.2. Random Migrant Assumption: Linking Migrants with Religious Affiliation 
In the absence of data on religious denomination of migrants, the random migrant 
assumption was used to link migrants with religious affiliations. This means we are 
assuming that the religious composition of the migrants is the same as the religious 
composition of the people residing in their country of birth or citizenship (in case of 
9 Other information regarding the number of refugees, i.e. the number of residents who have been granted 
asylum or subsidiary protection or the number of rejected asylum applications linked to an arrival date, are 
not available.  
22 
 
                                                            
asylum seekers). For example, about 29% of the German population are Roman Catholics; 
hence, 29% of the migrants to Austria with Germany as country of origin are counted as 
Roman Catholics. 
To apply the random migrant assumption we need to know the religious composition 
for each country of the world. The shares of population by religion in the respective 
countries are retrieved in two ways: For the most prominent countries sending migrants 
to Austria, we have collected up-to-date data from the national statistics (census 2011 
rounds) whenever these were available10, and for other countries we have relied on the 
data published by the Pew Research Center (2011, 2012). Religious compositions of the 
immigrants to Austria vary a great deal as shown for some of the most prominent sending 
countries in Figure 3. For the few persons with unknown citizenship and stateless persons 
we have applied the religious distribution of the world population.  
 
Figure 3: Religious composition of some of the most prominent countries of origin of 
migrants coming to Austria 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Afghanistan
Syrian Arab Republic
Turkey
Poland
Serbia
Hungary
Romania
Germany
Roman Catholics Protestants Orthodox Muslims Others None
 
Source: authors’ calculations based on national statistics (2011), PEW Research Center (2011, 2012) 
 
The random migrant assumption is likely to reflect reality unless migrants are selected 
in terms of their religion or other characteristics closely associated with religion (for 
example ethnicity). Some selection effects for the immigrants, for example in terms of 
their educational attainment (Grogger and Hanson 2011) and health status (Marmot, 
Adelstein and Bulusu 1984), are well-documented. In this respect asylum seekers can be 
seen as a specific group as political oppression, discrimination, human rights abuse, 
violent conflict, and state failure are all important determinants of asylum migration 
(Neumayer 2005). Most of these can be associated with specific subpopulations, including 
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Georgia, Germany, Hungary, Republic 
of Moldova, Montenegro, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, and Switzerland.  
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religious minorities. However, in the absence of more precise data, we need to use the 
‘random migrant’ assumption. 
 
3.2.3. Results 
Austria  
Table 1 gives an overview of the 10 most prominent countries of origin of migrants 
coming from abroad to Austria during the period 2001 to 2015, based on migration 
statistics provided by Statistik Austria. The total number of immigrants coming to Austria 
from abroad also includes a large group of Austrians returning back to the country after 
having lived abroad and in fact they are one of the largest groups ranking within the top 
three countries of origin in all three periods. Since this group is not the focus of migration 
policy measures, it is not displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1: Immigration from abroad to Austria: Top 10 countries of origin in the respective 
periods 
2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 
Germany  Germany  Germany 
Serbia and Montenegro  Romania  Romania 
Turkey  Hungary Hungary 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Poland Serbia 
Romania Turkey Poland 
Poland Slovakia Bosnia and Herzegovina 
Russian Federation Bosnia and Herzegovina Syrian Arab Republic 
Hungary Serbia Afghanistan  
Slovakia Serbia and Montenegro Slovakia 
Croatia Russian Federation Turkey 
Source: Statistik Austria  
Note: Serbia and Montenegro: Dissolution in 2006; however, pooled together in migration statistics until 2007, 
from 2008 onwards counted separately 
 
Compared to previous years, when the main countries of origin were Germany and 
some Eastern European countries, significant changes took place in 2011-2015 with the 
arrival of many migrants from the Syrian Arab Republic and Afghanistan (see Table 1). 
Immigration from Turkey dwindled during the 15 years of observation and this country 
was just among the top 10 in the last period only. Figure 4 shows the development of 
immigration and emigration as well as the resultant net migration between 2001 and 2015.  
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Figure 4: International migration to and from Austria 2001-2015  
 
 
Source: Statistik Austria, Federal Ministry of the Interior, authors’ calculations 
 
Migration shows a strong association with age. Adults in their early twenties have the 
highest migration rates, and migration decreases beyond that age (Rogers 1979). The 
observed migration patterns to and from Austria are in line with the mainstream 
literature (see Figure 5). Looking at the whole period from 2001 to 2015, about 57% of the 
immigrants were between 20 and 40 years of age. A similar pattern can be observed 
looking at emigration: about 55% of the emigrants were between 20 and 40 years of age. 
While in 2001-2005, and especially in 2006-2010, the majority of net-migrants was female 
(2001-2005 about 51% and 2006-2010 about 60%), in the 2011-2015 period about 52% of the 
net-migrants were men.  
 
25 
 
Figure 5: Austria - Age distributions of migrants 2001-2015  
Source: Statistik Austria 
 
 
In the period 2001 to 2005, the international net migration gain amounted to 203,462 
people. Immigration towards Austria summed up 568,999 people and was mainly driven 
by European immigration as approximately 73% came from European11 countries and 
51% from EU28 countries, with a majority originating from the old EU countries (EU15, 
31% of the total). From outside Europe, Turkey, China, and Nigeria represented the 
largest immigrant origins. By contrast, 365,537 persons moved from Austria to foreign 
countries during the same period. About 32% of the emigrants were born in Austria and 
49% in another European country. Given this context, the following religious composition 
was derived: about 33% of the net migration gain can be attributed to the Orthodox 
group, followed by Muslims with 31%. Roman Catholics made up 11% of the total 
number of net migrants; 10% of the net-migration is attributed to No religious affiliation, 
while Protestants and Others made up 7%.  
In the years that followed, the international net-migration gain was 112,592 and almost 
halved compared to the previous period. This has two reasons: Firstly, immigration 
decreased to 534,932. This decline can largely be attributed to the effects of the reform of 
the Aliens' Law Package in 2006, which restricted immigration of third-country nationals. 
The low level, however, also reflected the generally tense economic climate after the 
global financial crisis in 2008 (Kraler 2011, p. 26). Following the EU enlargements in 2004 
11 For the purpose of this report, Europe refers to the 28 current Member States of the European Union, plus 
following third countries: Andorra, Gibraltar, Vatican City State, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, San 
Marino, Switzerland, Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Belarus, Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, Russian 
Federation, Serbia, Ukraine, TFYR Macedonia, and Kosovo.  
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and 2007, the share of European immigrants increased to 78%, whereby the vast majority 
were born in EU28 member states (62% of the total). From outside Europe, people from 
Turkey, Iran, and the United States of America represented the largest immigrant 
populations. Secondly, emigration increased to 422,340 and was strongly characterised by 
a European component as about 79% were born in a European country. Regarding the 
religious composition of net migrants, the Orthodox group, with 31%, once again had the 
highest share of the net migration gain, and the share of Muslims declined to 23% in 
comparison to the previous years. The share of Protestants increased to 14%. Similarly, the 
group of No religion grew to 16% compared to the preceding period, whereas the share of 
Roman Catholics (10%) and Others (5%) fell slightly. 
In the period 2011 to 2015, international net-migration gain (333,757 people) almost 
tripled compared with the number for the previous period – primarily due to the sharp 
increase in immigration. 800,782 immigrants from abroad were registered. Especially the 
year 2015 was characterised by high immigration and influx of refugees. Once the 
numbers for the asylum seekers who arrived between November and December 2015 
were added to the volume of immigration stated in the migration statistics, immigration 
amounted to 819,918 persons. While an increasing number of migrants came from 
countries outside Europe such as Afghanistan, Syria, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq, the share of 
European immigrants decreased from around 78% in the previous period to 
approximately 71%. The trend of increasing emigration continued as 486,161 persons 
moved from Austria to a foreign country. Like in the past, emigration is dominated by a 
European composition (80%). Due to the new migration patterns, the share of Muslims in 
relation to the total net migration gain increased to 38%12 compared with previous years, 
whereas the share of the Orthodox group declined to 22%. The share of Roman Catholics 
increased to 18%, while Protestants (7%), Others (5%) and No religion (10%) experienced 
a decline. Figure 6 gives an overview about the religious distribution of net migration in 
the three periods from 2001 to 2015.  
 
12 Without adding first-time asylum applicants of November and December 2015, the share amounts to 35%.  
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Figure 6: Austria – Estimated religious distribution of net migration from 2001 to 2015 and 
respectively share in net migration 
 
 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 
Net migration 
CAT 
11% 10% 18% 
Net migration 
PRO 
7% 14% 7% 
Net migration 
ORT 
33% 31% 22% 
Net migration 
MUS 
31 % 23% 38% 
Net migration 
OTH 
7% 5% 5% 
Net migration 
NOR 
10% 16% 10% 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
Vienna 
Due to the large number of international immigrants, Vienna’s population has been 
growing in all years (Figure 7). Compared with other Federal States, Vienna is the major 
destination of international migration and it receives a larger share of immigrants than it 
has a share in the Austrian population. In 2015, approximately 36% of all new immigrants 
who came to Austria from abroad moved to Vienna. In addition to international 
migration, internal migration to and from Vienna has to be considered. While Vienna lost 
population through internal migration in the periods 2001-2005 (-4,871) and 2006-2010 (-
2,065) as more people moved out of Vienna to other Federal States than moved in from 
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these, the situation changed in the period 2011-2015, when the internal net migration gain 
amounted to 7,246 people.  
 
Figure 7: International and internal migration to and from Vienna 2001-2015 
 
Source: Statistik Austria, Federal Ministry of the Interior 
 
 
As in the case for the whole of Austria, the majority of immigrants coming to Vienna 
are between 20 and 40 years of age (see Figure 8). A similar pattern can be observed 
looking at emigration: about 62% of the emigrants were between 20 and 40 years of age. 
The share of male migrants increased slightly from 54% in the period 2001-2005 to 55% in 
the period 2011-2015. 
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Figure 8: Vienna - Age distributions of migrants 2001-2015 
 
Source: Statistik Austria 
 
As in the past, net migration in 2001 to 2005 for Vienna was positive due to 
international immigration and amounted to 96,909 people. The total number of 
(international and internal) immigrants amounted to 356,760. With 75% European 
immigrants the share was slightly higher compared with the whole of Austria (73%), 
whereby especially the share of immigrants from EU28 countries was higher for Vienna 
(57%) than for Austria (51%). Looking only at international immigration, the most 
prominent countries of origin were Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey, Poland, Germany, 
and Romania. Internal in-migration was dominated by people born in Austria (75%). In 
total, 259,851 persons moved away from Vienna, whereby the share was almost evenly 
divided between people moving to a foreign country and people moving to another 
region in Austria. The majority of people leaving Vienna were Austrians (54%), another 
29% originally came from another European country. Regarding religious composition, 
about 34% of the net migration gain can be attributed to the Orthodox group, 33% to the 
Muslims, followed by Roman Catholics with 12%. The share of Others was 8%, of No 
religion 7%, and Protestants made up 5%.  
In tandem with the decline in net migration for Austria as a whole in the years 2006 to 
2010, the net migration gain decreased for Vienna to 44,881 people – reduced by nearly 
half compared to the previous period. While international immigration to Vienna 
decreased to 210,372, internal in-migration towards Vienna rose in comparison to the 
previous years to 146,520. This resulted in a similar total number of migrants moving to 
Vienna as in the previous period (356,892). Regarding international migration, the most 
prominent countries of origin were Germany, Romania, Poland, Turkey, and Serbia. In 
total, the share of European immigrants increased to 79%; the share of immigrants coming 
from one of the EU28 member states also increased to 65%. These figures are very similar 
to the overall trend for Austria in this period. The decline in net migration can mainly be 
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explained by the fact that emigration and out-migration together increased to 358,957 – an 
increase of about 99,100 people. The outward flows are – as in the past – dominated by a 
European composition: 38% Austrians and 43% Europeans. The Orthodox group had the 
highest share of the net migration gain with 40%; the share of Muslims experienced a 
minor decline in comparison with the previous period to 31%. While the group of No 
religion grew to 12% and the share of Protestants increased to 9%, the share of Others 
(5%) and in particular the share of Roman Catholics (3%) decreased in comparison to the 
previous period. 
With a gain of some 129,688 people, net migration in the period 2011 and 2015 almost 
tripled compared with the previous period, which results in a similar picture to what was 
observed in Austria. In total 311,657 immigrants from abroad were registered in Vienna. 
When adding asylum seekers to the volume of international immigration stated in the 
migration statistics, as explained before, 318,622 international immigrants arrived in 
Vienna. But not only international immigration increased, also internal in-migration 
continued to rise, resulting, in contrast to the previous periods, in an internal net 
migration gain. In total, 487,290 people moved to Vienna during 2011 and 2015. The 
changing international migration pattern towards Austria also affected Vienna. 
Afghanistan and Syria are among the most important countries of origin of immigrants. 
The share of migrants born in a European country decreased, compared with the previous 
period, from 79% to 75% – the same level as in 2001-2005 and still higher than what was 
observed for Austria as a whole. The trend of increasing emigration and out-migration 
from Vienna continued in 2011-2015. Overall, 357,602 people left Vienna; as it has been the 
case in the previous years, the outward migration movement is characterised by a strong 
European component with approximately 81% of European background. Under those 
circumstances, the share of Muslims within the total net migration gain increased to 36%13 
compared with previous years, whereas the share of the Orthodox group declined to 25%. 
The share of Roman Catholics also increased compared to the previous years to 18%, 
while the shares of Protestants (6%) and of the unaffiliated (9%) decreased. The share of 
Others remained stable with 5%. Figure 9 presents an overview of the religious distribution 
of net migrants from 2001 to 2015.  
13 Without adding first-time asylum applicants of November and December 2015, the share amounts to 33%.  
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Figure 9: Vienna – Estimated religious distribution of net migration from 2001 to 2015 and 
respectively share in net migration 
 
 
 2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 
Total net migration 
CAT 
12% 3% 19% 
Total net migration 
PRO 
5% 9% 6% 
Total net migration 
ORT 
34% 40% 25% 
Total net migration 
MUS 
33% 31% 36% 
Total net migration 
OTH 
8% 5% 5% 
Total net migration 
NOR 
7% 12% 9% 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
3.3. Fertility – Data and Method  
Computation of fertility rates requires information on a) the number of live births to 
mothers by age and their religious affiliation, and b) number of women of reproductive 
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age (generally 15 to 49 years) of different religious affiliation. While Statistik Austria 
collects and publishes data on the religion of mothers of every child born in Austria, and 
also by Federal States (birth register)14, the data on number of women by age and religion 
(exposure) are not available from the Central Register of Residence (ZMR). The most 
recent available data for both data series pertain to 2001. Beyond this year, religious 
composition of Austria’s population had to be estimated. Thus, the data on women by age 
and religion that enter fertility calculations are derived from the reconstruction based on 
the census 2001, migration statistics 2001-2015 (random migrant assumption for religion), 
and mortality and secularisation trends, as detailed in the reconstruction section of the 
report.  
The information on the religion of the mother that is available from the birth register 
suffers from several deficiencies for our purposes, particularly since the data are recorded 
in pre-defined categories that in some cases differ from our definitions. The birth register 
information on religious affiliation is limited to the following categories: Roman Catholic, 
Protestant (‘Evangelic’), Old Catholic, Jewish, Muslim, Jehovah Witnesses, no religion or 
unknown, and other registered religions. Live births to Orthodox women, who are a 
significant group both in Vienna and in Austria, are included in the ‘Others’ residual 
category. Those with no religion and unknown/unreported religion are aggregated into a 
single category whose size is increasing as more and more mothers do not report any 
religion. Therefore, we made the following adjustments: 
- We have assumed the same age-specific fertility rates for Orthodox women in 
Austria as for all women; 
- In order to suppress the effect of the non-reporting of religious affiliation we 
assumed fixed differentials (ratio) between the total fertility rate of women with 
no religion and the overall total fertility rate in Austria, 
- Other religions is a residual category. Live births in this category were computed 
as the difference between all live births and live births to women in other 
categories (Roman Catholic, Protestant, Muslim, Orthodox, None). 
 
Overall, this means that the fertility rate estimates are more reliable for Roman Catholics, 
Protestants and Muslims than for the other groups. Uncertainty is highest for Orthodox 
and Others. 
Since the reconstruction was performed in 5-year steps, fertility rates are presented for 
5-year periods.  
Vienna 
In Vienna the religiously unaffiliated constitute a significant share of the population of 
women in reproductive ages (24% in 2001 compared to 11% in Austria). The data on live 
births seem not to be affected by non-reporting as much as for the whole of Austria. Thus, 
14 Religion of the mother is available until 2015. Due to increasing non-response in the reporting of religion of 
mothers and fathers, Statistics Austria will not publish any data on the religion of parents beyond 2015. 
33 
 
                                                            
we made no adjustments to live birth data for Vienna. For Orthodox and Others we use 
the same fertility rates that are identical to the average for this broad group. Counts of 
women by age and religion were obtained using the same procedure as detailed above for 
Austria.  
 
3.3.1. Results 
Austria 
Total fertility rate (TFR)15 has been on an upward trajectory in Austria throughout the 21st 
century. Between 2001 and 2015, TFR for all women in Austria increased from 1.36 to 1.49 
(Zeman et al. 2015; Statistik Austria 201616) and it changed from 1.38 to 1.45 between 2001-
2005 and 2011-2015 (see Figure 10). These are relatively low values in comparison to some 
other European countries and Austrian fertility is consistently slightly below the EU 
average, however, very similar levels are seen across the German-speaking and 
neighbouring countries to Austria (VID and IIASA 2016).  
The TFRs of Christians and unaffiliated women followed the general increasing trend, 
with the largest gains among the unaffiliated (+0.09) and Roman Catholics (+0.08). In spite 
of a moderate increase, TFR has been below 1.5 children per woman with small variation 
across the religious groups except for Muslims. Unlike for other groups, Muslim fertility 
has been declining and dropped to 2.26 children per woman in 2011-2015. As a result, the 
gap between the fertility of Muslims and overall TFR of Austrian women has narrowed 
down: in 2001-2005, Muslim TFR was double the average of Austria but in 2011-2015 it 
was 56% higher.  
 
15 Total fertility rate (TFR) is an estimate of the number of children who would be born to women in 
reproductive age at a given calendar period if they were to pass through the childbearing schedule of that 
period. Thus, TFR is not equivalent to lifetime fertility of these women, but an estimate based on the situation 
in a given year. Due to changes in age at childbearing, TFRs can differ substantially compared to actual 
lifetime fertility. 
16 http://www.statistik.at/web_en/statistics/PeopleSociety/population/births/index.html (last accessed on 
February 28, 2017).  
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Figure 10: Total Fertility Rates by religion, Austria 
 
Source: Statistik Austria birth register, authors’ calculations. 
 
Women of no religious affiliation used to have the lowest fertility rates; however, this 
has changed and in 2011-2015 Protestant women were the lowest fertility group. Their 
TFRs remain below the lowest-low fertility threshold (defined as 1.3 children per women 
by Kohler, Billari and Ortega (2002)). 
One trend that is common for women of all religious groups is postponement of 
childbearing towards later age. This is true also for Muslim women, who still have high 
fertility in their 20s, but between 2001-2005 and 2011-2015 their teenage fertility as well as 
fertility rates at age 20-24 declined significantly (see Figure 11). 
 
 
Figure 11: Fertility age schedules for women by religious affiliation, Austria 
 
Source: Statistik Austria birth register, authors’ calculations. 
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Roman Catholic, Protestant and unaffiliated women have very similar childbearing age 
patterns, typical with highest fertility rates at age 30-34 and fertility increases among 
women 35 and older. For the Orthodox and Others the data are too scarce to make 
meaningful observations.  
Overall we can conclude that the religious differentials have been narrowing down 
since 2001 and the data are in agreement with the fertility convergence hypothesis. 
 
Vienna 
Compared to Austria, TFRs of Viennese women are practically identical during the three 
observed periods (1.38 in 2001-2005, 1.41 in 2006-2010, 1.44 in Vienna compared to 1.45 in 
Austria in 2011-2015). Fertility has increased and variation across the religious groups has 
declined in both. Similarly to Austria, TFRs of the unaffiliated (+0.23) and Roman Catholic 
women (+0.22) increased the most (see Figure 12). Viennese Roman Catholic and 
Protestant women have their children at much later age – mostly after age 30 – compared 
to women in the rest of Austria. Fertility of Muslim women has declined more rapidly in 
Vienna than in Austria overall (-0.1). Due to the substantial influx of immigrants from 
predominantly Muslim countries, and the significant share of asylum seekers finding 
lodgings in Vienna, these recent arrivals have boosted the number of women in 
reproductive age. In 2011-2015 the number of births to Muslim women reported in the 
birth register declined and the TFR dropped as well. However, fewer births may not be 
the main reason why we observed lower TFR. In the same period, and particularly in 
2015, the number of Muslim women in reproductive age increased sharply as a result of 
intensified migration. It is possible that the declining number of births really means a 
declining fertility rate, since the number of births declined, but the fertility rates are 
sensitive to changes in the size and composition of the female population17 and a 
significant number of recently arrived Muslim women may have shifted the TFRs 
downwards. The largest decline occurred in young ages below 25, and we know that most 
new immigrant were young. If the change in fertility rates is mainly due to a declining 
intensity of childbearing, this would be symptomatic of transition towards below-
replacement fertility. Although Muslim women differ in their reproductive behaviour 
from Christian and unaffiliated women, these differences are diminishing over time (see 
Figure 13).  
17 Fertility rates are computed as a ratio between recent number of births and number of women in age group 
15-49, thus an abrupt change in the number of female population results in a changing rate even if there was 
no behavioural change. 
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Figure 12: Total Fertility Rates by religion, Vienna 
 
Source: Statistik Austria birth register, authors’ calculations. 
 
Figure 13: Fertility age schedules for women by religious affiliation, Vienna 
 
Source: Statistik Austria birth register, authors’ calculations 
 
3.4. Secularisation 
Secularisation and religious conversions are crucial for capturing the changes in the 
religious landscape of Austria and Vienna. Information about change of religious 
denomination by Federal States in terms of entrance and exit from the Roman Catholic 
Church and Protestant Church18 respectively were collected from the Austrian statistical 
18 The Protestant Church consists only of the Evangelical Church of the Augsburg and Helvetic Confessions – 
other Protestant confessions are not counted under this group. 
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yearbook (Statistisches Jahrbuch Österreichs). We interpolated to estimate the missing 
data for the years 2012 and 2015 for the Protestant Church. For the years 2011 and 2015, 
data for the Catholic Church are available for Austria, but not for Vienna. To estimate the 
entry and exit for these years, the annual change rate of the Diocese Vienna (which does 
not follow the administrative borders of Vienna, but also includes parts of Lower Austria) 
was applied to the figures for Vienna (Katholische Kirche 2017).  
 
Overall, Roman Catholic and Protestant Churches have been losing members in a 
similar way, but to a different extent (see Figure 14 and Figure 15). Most of the Roman 
Catholic peak losses (2004, 2010) correspond to church-related scandals. Those exits 
resulted in an increasing share of people with no religious denomination.  
 
Figure 14: Austria - Absolute numbers of exiting Roman Catholics and Protestants 
 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch Österreichs and authors’ calculations 
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Figure 15: Vienna - Absolute numbers of exiting Roman Catholics and Protestants 
 
Source: Statistisches Jahrbuch Österreichs and authors’ calculations 
 
Official statistics on religious switching for Orthodox and Muslims are not available; 
we therefore turned to the Gender and Generations Survey (GGS)19 to see if there is any 
evidence of religious switching for these groups. As expected, we find that Protestants 
and Roman Catholics are more likely to change religion (Figure 16). Those leaving these 
two denominations are much more likely to become secular (unaffiliated) than change to 
a different denomination. Only about 5% of Orthodox or Muslims changed their 
affiliation, and again the exits were mostly to no religion. The unaffiliated are particularly 
stable as a group, however, this result may be related to the phrasing of the survey 
questions.  
 
19 In the second wave of the GGS, collected in 2012-2013, the respondents (men and women 18 to 50 years old) 
were asked what their religious affiliation was at the time of the survey, whether they had a different religion 
previously, and if so, what denomination it was. Using these three questions we could compute probability 
matrix between the religious groups. 
39 
 
                                                            
Figure 16: Probabilities of religious switching for 18-50 year old adults in Austria 
according to GGS 2012-2013 
 
Source: GGS 2012-2013, authors’ calculations; Note: Weighted counts in brackets.  
According to the GGS, men are more likely to change religious affiliation than women. 
This finding is in line with the existing scientific literature (Pew Research Center 2016). 
This factor was considered in the reconstruction by attributing a higher share of leavers to 
the male population (53%) compared to the female one (47%) based on the GGS data. 
 
3.5. Mortality 
The evidence of a relationship between religion and mortality is inconclusive. While some 
studies find religiosity to be associated with better health outcomes (see Hummer et al. 
2004), others suggest that as the more religious tend to have lower education levels 
(Glaeser and Sacerdote 2008; Inglehart and Baker 2000), they would have worse health 
outcomes (Groot and Van Den Brink 2007). Klotz and Gisser (2015) analysed mortality 
differentials by religious denomination in Vienna in the period 1981 to 2002 and 
concluded that selection effects associated with international migration and socio-
economic disparities between religious groups influence mortality differentials.  
For this project, mortality differentials by religion were not considered, as the data are 
not available. Thus, mortality rates are identical across all religious affiliations. Mortality 
rates by 5-year age groups are extracted from life tables available at Statistik Austria 
(Jährliche Sterbetafeln). Life tables are available both for the whole of Austria and for 
Vienna. 
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3.6. Population in 2016 
The reconstructed population of 2016 by religion shows that the religious composition of 
the Austrian population has changed noticeably since 2001 (see Figure 17). The 
secularisation trend continued and the share of the Roman Catholics has declined further 
from 3/4 of the population in 2001 to 2/3 in 2016. Most of the relative increase occurred in 
the group of the population without religion, who account for 17% of the population in 
2016 compared to 12% in 2001. The Orthodox and Muslim communities have grown 
substantially, from 2% to 5% for the Orthodox and from 4% to 8% for the Muslims 
between 2001 and 2016. The change in religious landscape is similarly impressive in the 
city of Vienna, where the share of Roman Catholics has further decreased to 35% in 2016 
(from 49% in 2001). At the same time, the share of the unaffiliated reached 30% in 2016; it 
increased by mere 4 percentage points since 2011 (26%). The share of Muslims increased 
most rapidly with 14% in 2016 (from 8% in 2001), followed by the Orthodox, whose 
proportion rose from 6% in 2001 to 10% in 2016. 
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Figure 17: Share of the population by religion in 2001 and in 2016, Austria and Vienna 
Austria in 2001 Austria in 2016 
  
Vienna in 2001 Vienna in 2016 
  
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
 
4. Part II: The religious Composition in 2046 across Different 
Scenarios 
The reconstructed population by age, sex and religion on January 1, 2016 as mentioned 
above serves as basis for the projection scenarios. The next step is to look at the future 
following different scenarios.  
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4.1. Scenario and Narratives of Possible Futures 
Scenarios are commonly used in population projections to show the uncertainty about the 
future. It is crucial to emphasise that scenarios are not to be viewed as forecasts, but rather 
as means to answer various hypothetical questions. What-if projection scenarios allow to 
sketch out alternative possible futures or to demonstrate the effect of certain constraints 
on mid- to long-term population change or composition. This means that several possible 
futures are mapped, each of which is plausible but not certain (van der Heijden, 1996).  
To develop scenarios, critical uncertainties have to be identified to answer what 
driving forces of change are most uncertain, but will have a great impact on future 
developments. Starting point of a scenario analysis is the formulation of narratives of 
possible futures involving the identified uncertainties and driving forces. The narratives 
are then translated into scenario assumptions. Similarly to the reconstruction work, the 
projections to 2046 require assumptions about the following:  
(1) age- and religion-specific fertility from 2016 to 2046;  
(2) age- and sex-specific mortality from 2016 to 2046;  
(3) age-, sex- and religion-specific internal and international migration flows (in and 
out) from 2016-2046;  
(4) age- and sex-specific religious switching from 2016 to 2046. 
In the case of projections, and contrary to the reconstruction, we have no information 
about the different components of change, except that many of the determinants of 
population growth have a large momentum. This is also true for religious change, but less 
so for international migration, which tends to be more volatile. We have focused 
specifically on international migration to project the possible future religious composition 
of Austria’s and Vienna’s population, as Goujon et al. (2014) have shown that migration 
was one of the key drivers shaping the religious landscape in Vienna.  
We have formulated a range of scenario assumptions along a scale of hypothetical 
situations ranging from closed borders and restrictive policies to open borders with 
unrestricted migration policies. These narratives have implications in terms of volumes 
and composition of international migration. We have linked the more restrictive 
migration scenario to a predominantly European immigration, while the open border 
scenario translates into increased immigration from the Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA) and from Sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Figure 18: Scenarios  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Closed borders and restrictive migration 
policies  
Open borders and high migration 
Low immigration High immigration European mobility Diversity 
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The other demographic (fertility) and religion (religious switching) determinants are 
derived so as to be consistent with the migration narratives and in agreement with 
scientific knowledge. Furthermore, the scenarios take into account overall migration and 
fertility assumptions of Statistik Austria in their different scenarios. Table 2 gives a brief 
overview of the main components of our four narratives. The four scenarios summarised 
in the table below are tools intended to help imagine the different scenarios and thus have 
not been assigned probabilities. 
 
Table 2: Scenario Narratives 
Scenario  Narrative 
European mobility International migration flows to Austria follow the medium 
variant and are mainly composed of Europeans (as observed 
in 2006-2010). Fertility follows a medium path, as well as 
secularisation.  
Diversity  International migration flows to Austria follow the medium 
variant and have a strong non-European composition as 
observed in 2011-2015. Fertility follows a medium path, as 
well as secularisation. 
Low immigration International migration flows to Austria are declining and 
come to a halt by 2021 when Austria closes its borders. 
Fertility is low and secularisation trends are high. In this 
scenario future changes in the religious composition of the 
population are primarily driven by natural change (i.e. births 
and deaths) and religious switching.  
High immigration  External borders lose relevance and international migration 
flows to and from Austria increase compared to the past. The 
extra-immigrants (compared to the number of immigrants in 
2011-2015) come mainly from the Middle East and North 
African (MENA) and sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. 
Fertility is high and secularisation trends are low. 
 
 
4.2. Migration 
Estimating future migration is challenging as migration flows are sensitive to government 
policies, economic conditions and international events that can change rapidly. The 
overall migration figures of the developed scenarios are based on the different population 
projection scenarios of Statistik Austria: Low migration scenario (Untere 
Wanderungsvariante), high migration scenario (Obere Wanderungsvariante) and main 
scenario (Hauptvariante). Figure 19 shows the range of net migration flows in the 
different scenarios.  
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Figure 19: Net-migration according to the different scenarios of Statistik Austria 
 
Source: Statistik Austria Population Forecasts 
  
Statistik Austria publishes the main scenario (Hauptvariante) both for the whole of 
Austria and also for each Federal Province, including Vienna. For the other scenarios, 
however, only figures for Austria are available. Thus, the ratio of the main scenario 
regarding – international as well as internal – migrants moving to and from Vienna in 
relation to the figures for migration for Austria was applied to the low migration scenario 
and to the high migration scenario to estimate the number of migrants in the low and high 
migration scenario for Vienna.  
Migration patterns between certain sending and receiving countries are often 
established due to prior links and networks after an initial migration connection such 
guest worker programmes, linguistic or geographical proximity or shared historical 
connections. This is important regarding projections, as our estimates are to some extent 
based on migration trends that could be observed in the period 2006 to 2010 as well as in 
the period 2011 to 2015.  
4.2.1. European Mobility Scenario 
Austria  
The scenario European mobility follows the main scenario of Statistik Austria population 
projections. In Statistik Austria's main scenario, immigration peaks in 2016-2020 with 
841,000 immigrants and afterwards this projected number declines to 725,000 in 2041-
2045. These volumes of immigration are considerably higher than what was observed in 
the past before 2011, and slightly lower than those observed in the most recent period 
(2011-2015). We further link these migration inflows with a composition dominated by 
Europeans: 78% of the immigrants would come from European countries, 62% from 
EU28-countries. This composition is similar to the one observed in Austria in 2006-2010.  
Whereas immigration is declining after 2020, emigration rises continuously from 
486,161 in 2011-2015 to 526,368 in 2016-2020 and further to 599,143 in 2041-2045. The 
volumes are again taken from the main scenario of Statistik Austria population 
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projections. Similarly to immigration, we suppose that emigration is also dominated by 
Europeans: about 79% of the emigrants were born in a European country. Thus, the 
majority of immigrants and emigrants would belong to a Christian denomination.  
Figure 20 gives an overview of the estimated religious composition of net migrants in 
this scenario. The share of Christian net migrants is projected to increase from 47% (2011-
2015) to 52% (2041-2045), whereby the different Christian20 groups would follow varying 
trends: The share of Orthodox is projected to increase from 22% to 34% and that of 
Protestants as well from 7% to 14%, whereas the share of Roman Catholics would 
decrease from 19% to only 4%. While the share of Muslim net migrants is projected to 
decrease from 38% in 2011-2015 to 25% in 2041-2045, the share of unaffiliated net migrants 
would grow from about 10% in 2011-2015 to 17% in 2041-2045.  
 
Figure 20: Scenario European mobility: Migration to and from Austria 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
Vienna 
Based on the main scenario of Statistik Austria population projections, immigration from 
abroad and in-migration from other Federal States towards Vienna would increase in the 
first projection period (2016-2020) to 512,319, compared with the observed volume of 
487,290 persons in 2011-2015. Thereafter, migration towards Vienna is assumed to decline 
20 For the purpose of this report, Christian refers to Roman Catholics, Protestants and the Orthodox group. 
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to 464,266 until 2041-2045, but is still considerably higher than what was observed in the 
past before 2011. International emigration and internal out-migration from Vienna would 
increase sharply between 2011-2015 (357,602, observed volume) and 2016-2020 (413,605 
assumed outflow) and increase continuously thereafter. From 2031-2035 onwards, Vienna 
experiences a migration loss as emigration and out-migration exceeds immigration and 
in-migration. This trend of internal net migration loss was also observed in the 2001-2005 
and 2006-2010 periods.  
The composition of migration flows towards and from Vienna is largely based on the 
trend which was observed in the years 2006 to 2010 with a strong EU component of 
migrants arriving in Vienna. In order to ensure that the internal net migration flow (in- 
and out-migration) is representative of the future population living in Vienna and Austria 
respectively, from 2026 onwards the random migrant assumption is used for estimating 
the religious distribution of the internal net migration. This assumption was applied in all 
scenarios for Vienna.  
Figure 21 presents an overview of the estimated migration to and from Vienna by 
religion in this scenario. Regarding the religious composition of net migrants, the by far 
largest net migration gain is attributed to the Orthodox migrants during the whole period. 
The share of Muslims net migrants is projected to decrease considerably compared with 
the period 2011-2015. Similarly, the share of Roman Catholic and of unaffiliated migrants 
would decline strongly; from 2026-2030 onwards, these two groups would be 
characterised by a negative net migration.  
 
Figure 21: Scenario European mobility: Migration to and from Vienna 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
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4.2.2. Diversity Scenario 
Austria  
Similarly to the European mobility scenario detailed in the previous section, the projected 
migration flows in the Diversity scenario follow the main scenario of Statistik Austria 
population projections. Immigration peaks in 2016-2020 with 841,000 immigrants and 
would decrease to 725,000 in 2041-2045. In contrast to the European mobility scenario, the 
composition of the migration flow is similar to what was observed in Austria in 2011-2015 
with immigration being characterised by a rather strong non-European component. In this 
scenario countries such as Afghanistan, Syria, Iran and Iraq are among the most 
prominent countries sending migrants to Austria. The share of European immigrants 
coming to Austria makes up approximately 73% of the total number of immigrants (6 
percentage points less than in the European mobility scenario), and the share of immigrants 
coming from EU28 is 58% of the total.  
Whereas immigration is projected to decrease after 2020 in Statistik Austria's main 
scenario, emigration would increase steadily from 486,161 in 2011-2015 (observed flow) to 
599,143 in 2041-2045 and would be dominated by Europeans: about 79% of the emigrants 
in this scenario originate from a European country. The estimated religious composition 
of migration to and from Austria is summarized in Figure 22).  
Looking at net migration, the share of Muslim net migrants is projected to increase 
from 38% in 2011-2015 to 59% in 2041-2045. The share of Christian net migrants would 
decrease from 47% in 2011-2015 to 29% in 2041-2045, whereby the trend between the 
different Christian groups would vary as the share of Orthodox net migrants is projected 
to increase from 22% in 2011-2015 to 28% in 2041-2045, while the Roman Catholic and 
Protestant net migrants would experience a decline.  
 
48 
 
Figure 22: Scenario Diversity: Migration to and from Austria 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
Vienna 
Based on the main scenario of Statistik Austria, international immigration and internal 
in-migration towards Vienna is projected to increase in the first period (2016-2020) to 
512,319 and then to decrease to 464,266 until 2041-2045. Emigration and out-migration 
from Vienna would rise quite sharply between 2011-2015 (357,602) and 2016-2020 
(413,605) and are projected to increase continuously thereafter. From 2031 onwards 
Vienna would experience a migration loss as international emigration and out-migration 
to other Federal States exceed immigration and in-migration (see Figure 23).  
In contrast to the European mobility scenario, in the Diversity scenario the patterns of 
migration flows are characterised by a stronger non-European component based on the 
situation in the years 2011-2015. The high influx of asylum seekers to Austria in the year 
2015 most probably influenced migration towards Vienna; we therefore adjusted the 
composition of migrants coming to Vienna in 2016: We assumed that about 36%21 of the 
21 This share is derived as a forward projection from the overall trend of international migrants moving to 
Vienna in 2015. In a sensitivity analysis we applied the share of 50%. The results showed that this increase of 
the share had no impact on the estimated share of Muslims in 2046.  
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persons who applied for asylum in Austria in 2015, coming mainly from Afghanistan, 
Syria, Iraq and Iran, would settle in Vienna.  
Figure 23 summarizes the estimated migration by religion to and from Vienna. The 
largest net migration gain can be attributed to the Orthodox, closely followed by the 
Muslim migrants. The share of Roman Catholic and of unaffiliated migrants is projected 
to decrease strongly; already from 2021-2025 onwards, the Roman Catholics would be 
characterised by a negative net migration.  
 
Figure 23: Scenario Diversity: Migration to and from Vienna 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
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4.2.3. Low Immigration Scenario 
Austria 
Scenario Low immigration follows the low migration scenario of Statistik Austria's 
population projections in the first period (2016-2020). We suppose that this immigration 
flow would be composed of a considerable share of immigrants from non-European 
countries, similar to what was observed in 2011-2015. One of the rationales for high share 
of non-European immigrants in the first projection period is the fact that non-European 
immigrants, and among them many asylum seekers who arrived to Austria in 2011-2015, 
have the right to bring their direct family members through family reunification. This 
means that even though we foresee future restrictions on immigration in this scenario, the 
share of non-European immigrants would decline only later. Migration research has 
shown that restrictions of migration policies can have an unintended, counterproductive 
effect “in the form of ‘now or never’ migration” (de Haas 2006, p. 10) as increasing 
restrictiveness interrupts circularity and encourages permanent settlement.  
Looking at net migration, the share of Muslim migrants is projected to increase from 
38% in 2011-2015 to 45% in 2016-2020. The share of Christian net migrants would decrease 
from 47% (2011-2015) to 41% (2016-2020), whereby especially the share of Roman 
Catholics (from 19% to 13%) would decrease while the share of Protestants (from 7% to 
6%) and the share of Orthodox (from 22% to 23%) would remain relatively stable. The 
share of migrants with other religions (5%) is projected to remain stable and the share of 
unaffiliated migrants to decrease marginally from 10% to around 9%.  
From 2021 onwards, we imagine that migration gets to zero, leading to no international 
migration (neither in nor out) (see Figure 24). In this highly hypothetical scenario, future 
changes in the religious composition of the population are driven by natural change (i.e. 
births and deaths) and religious mobility rather than migration.  
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Figure 24: Scenario Low immigration: Migration to and from Austria 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
Vienna 
Based on the adapted low migration scenario of Statistik Austria's population projections 
in the first years (2016-2020), international immigration as well as internal in-migration 
towards Vienna is projected to decrease to 471,998 compared with 487,290 in 2011-2016. 
By contrast, emigration and out-migration would increase between the period 2011-2015 
(357,602) and 2016-2020 (410,971).  
From 2021 onwards, migration to Austria comes to a hypothetical halt. Internal 
migration to and from Vienna, however, still occurs in this scenario, leading to an overall 
net migration loss in the years 2021 to 2045 as migration from Vienna to other regions of 
the country is larger than migration towards Vienna (see Figure 25). As a result of this 
internal migration pattern, more unaffiliated leave the city than move in. This trend of 
internal net migration loss was also observed in the years 2001-2005 as well as 2006-2010. 
In this scenario, internal migration to and from Vienna becomes the main driver of 
population change. 
With respect to the religious composition of migrants, in the first period (2016-2020) 
the share of Orthodox is projected to increase from 25% (2011-2015) to 32% and that of 
Muslims from 36% (2011-2015) to 40%. By contrast, the other religious groups would 
experience a decline. From 2021-2025 net migration in total is negative, resulting in a net 
migration loss for all religious groups.  
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Figure 25: Scenario Low immigration: Migration to and from Vienna 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
4.2.4. High Immigration Scenario 
Austria  
The number of migrants follows the high migration scenario for population projections of 
Statistik Austria, with a peak in the period 2016-2020 at the volume of 991,000 immigrants. 
Until 2041-2045 this number steadily decreases to 875,000, but is still substantially higher 
than the immigration observed in the past. This increase is attributed to a strong rise in 
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immigration from the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) countries22 as well as 
from sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries23.  
Since the Arab Spring, MENA countries have been undergoing profound changes that 
have triggered refugee movements due to violent conflicts as well as social and political 
instability in the region. According to Faath and Mattes (2014, p. 187) MENA countries 
will remain one of the most conflict-laden regions in the world. The volatility of the region 
and the subsequent migration are also affecting the European continent. Demographic 
trends in the MENA region also have the potential to affect migration patterns: The 
combination of a significant decline in child mortality and the relatively slow onset of 
fertility decline led to a strong increase in MENA’s working age population. This so-called 
demographic youth bulge puts the labour markets in MENA countries heavily under 
pressure (Müller, Sievert and Klingholz 2016, p. 13). In an in-depth study of migration 
from MENA to OECD countries, Gubert and Nordman (2008, p. 3) pointed out that 
“increased labour mobility from the MENA Region could compensate for demographic 
trends in European labour markets in the next two decades, while constituting a response 
to the lack of employment in the home countries.”  
Migrants from SSA countries made up only a minority of immigrants to Austria in the 
past years; in 2015 mere 2% of all immigrants came from SSA countries. Recent studies, 
however, suggest that demographic trends and the demand for high- and low-skilled 
labour will continue to attract migrants from outside the EU and with a high chance that 
those migrants will come from increasingly geographically distant countries (de Haas 
2011, p. S66). Sub-Saharan Africa's population is rising fast; the number of people in the 
region will likely have doubled by 2050 (Sippel et al. 2011, p. 6). Thus, a major 
development challenge in this region is the productive employment of the millions of 
youth who are entering the labour market. For that reason the region is likely to become 
one of the largest sources of potential emigration (Adepoju 2008, p. 54-55). Parallel to the 
increase in immigration, emigration constantly increases until 2045 in this scenario. 
Emigration is dominated by Europeans, and consequently the majority of emigrants, 
about 66%, belong to Christian religious groups. 
 
22 The following list gives an overview about the countries included in the MENA region for this project, 
sorted by volume of immigration to Austria in the period 2011 to 2015: Syria, Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Egypt, 
Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Israel, Libya, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, United Arab Emirates, Palestine, 
Yemen, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, and Bahrain. 
23 The following list is sorted by the volume of immigrants to Austria in the period 2011 to 2015, with the 
largest countries of origin first: Nigeria, Somalia, Ghana, South, Africa, Gambia, Kenya, Sudan, Ethiopia, 
Cameroon, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Senegal, Guinea, Uganda, Eritrea, Sierra Leone, Congo, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Liberia, Angola, Zimbabwe, Mali, Guinea-Bissau, United Republic of Tanzania, Rwanda, 
Madagascar, Namibia, Benin, Burkina Faso, Togo, Niger, Mauritius, Gabon, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, 
Mauritania, Chad, Burundi, Réunion, Cape Verde, Seychelles, Swaziland, Botswana, Lesotho, Central African 
Republic, Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti, Western Sahara, Sao Tome and Principe, and Comoros.  
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Figure 26: Scenario High immigration migration to and from Austria 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
While the population in MENA region is overwhelmingly Muslim, sub-Saharan Africa 
is a patchwork of different religious traditions and many countries are more religiously 
diverse than those in Europe. Overall, the majority of the population in SSA countries, 
approximately 63%, is of Christian beliefs (PEW 2011), in particular of various Protestant 
denominations (36%, PEW 2011). Therefore, the increased immigration of African 
Christians may not necessarily boost the numbers of Roman Catholics or traditional 
Protestant churches established in Austria. In contrast, they have the potential to further 
diversify the religious landscape. A significant share of SSA’s population is Muslim. This 
is particularly true for the major sending countries to Austria, which are Nigeria (49% 
Muslims in the population, PEW 2012) and Somalia (nearly 100% Muslims, PEW 2012)24.  
Looking at net migrants (see Figure 26), the share of Muslim net migrants is projected 
to increase from 38% in 2011-2015 to 53% in 2016-2020; this share then increases further to 
64% in 2041-2045. The overall share of Christian net migrants is projected to decrease from 
47% (2011-2015) to 27% (2041-2045), whereby the different groups show different patterns: 
While the share of Protestants net migrants would remain stable by about 7% in 2041-2045 
and the share of Orthodox net migrants would only decrease by about 3 percentage points 
24 It is important to point out that Islam is not a monolithic religion either and that Muslim immigrants 
originating from different countries may adhere to multiple Islamic traditions. 
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to 19% in 2041-2045, the share of Roman Catholics net migrants is projected to decrease 
strongly from 18% in 2011-2015 to only 1% in 2041-2045.  
Vienna 
The high migration scenario of Statistik Austria determines not only high international 
immigration, but also a high volume of internal migration. As for the whole of Austria, 
this scenario for Vienna is characterised by high immigration from MENA25 and SSA26 
countries.  
Whereas international immigration to Vienna is projected to reach its peak in the 
period 2016-2020 and to steadily decrease thereafter, internal in-migration towards 
Vienna is projected to constantly increase from 2016 until 2045. In total, migration 
towards Vienna would peak in 2016-2020 (573,317), then drop until 2036-2040 (537,572) 
and then slightly rise again in 2041-2045 (540,679). In tandem with increased migration 
towards Vienna, emigration and out-migration are also characterised by a sharp increase 
compared with trends observed in the past (see Figure 27).  
 
The largest net migration gain in this scenario can be attributed to Muslims, followed 
by the Orthodox group. While the share of Protestants would increase over the periods, 
the Roman Catholics and of the unaffiliated group are both projected to experience a net 
migration loss from 2026-2030 onwards.  
 
25 The main countries of origin in the MENA region of migrants moving to Vienna were similar to the 
composition of those moving to Austria as a whole. MENA countries sorted by size of immigration to Vienna 
in the period 2011 to 2015: Syria, Turkey, Iran, Egypt, Algeria, Tunisia, Morocco, Palestine, Lebanon, Libya, 
Israel, United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Yemen, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and Bahrain.  
26 SSA countries sorted by the volume of immigration to Vienna in the period 2011 to 2015: Nigeria, Somalia, 
Gambia, Sudan, Kenya, Guinea, South Africa, Ghana, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, 
Cameroon, Liberia, Senegal, Angola, Eritrea, Mali, Zimbabwe, Ethiopia, Guinea-Bissau, Uganda, Congo, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Rwanda, Togo, Madagascar, Niger, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Benin, United Republic of Tanzania, 
Burundi, Gabon, Namibia, Chad, Malawi, Zambia, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Mauritius, 
Botswana, Mozambique, Seychelles, Western Sahara, Comoros, Equatorial Guinea, Djibouti, Lesotho, 
Réunion, Sao Tome and Principe and Swaziland. 
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Figure 27: Scenario High immigration: Migration to and from Vienna 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
4.3. Fertility 
Future fertility assumptions are a more stable component of the projection assumptions in 
comparison to more volatile migration. Moreover, fertility rates in Austria have been 
relatively unchanged in the past years and the postponement transition theory that 
applies to low fertility settings (Bongaarts and Sobotka 2012; Sobotka 2004) suggests that 
we can expect either a mild fertility increase or a levelling off of the TFR at about the 
current level in the foreseeable future.  
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Fertility assumptions consist of the outlook on the future TFR levels, and on how 
different or similar we think the differences in fertility of religious groups will unfold. As 
for the fertility levels in whole Austria, we follow a single scenario that is identical to the 
main scenario in the latest population projection of Statistik Austria. Out of the three 
fertility scenarios that Statistik Austria prepared for their population projections, the main 
scenario (Hauptvariante) best reflects the above stated hypothesis about future fertility27.  
Our three fertility scenarios – slow, fast convergence and trend scenario – differ in the 
pace of convergence in TFRs across the religious groups. These scenarios are detailed 
below. 
Religion-specific fertility rates are crucial in the projection as they generate number of 
births by religion in interaction with the age and religious composition of the women in 
reproductive age. Young adults can later change their religious affiliation and religion-
specific migration, and mortality further alters initial religious composition of the new-
borns. 
4.3.1. Austria 
In the main scenario of Statistik Austria, which we are following in our projection, the 
overall TFR slowly increases to 1.60 children per woman in 2100, an increase of 0.15 over 
more than 50 years. In 2041-2045, which is the latest projected period, an increase to 1.56 
children to woman is expected.  
The future TFRs of women in the six religious groups are derived from the overall 
target TFRs for all women in Austria and assumptions on the pace of fertility 
convergence. In practice we anchored religion-specific TFR to the overall target TFR level 
through the ratio (religion-specific TFR / overall TFR) and we let the ratio converge to 1 
(identical TFR across all religions) at different time horizons. In the fast convergence 
scenario (Low immigration) we assume the same TFRs for all women as early as 2046-2050; 
in scenarios European mobility and Diversity, in 2071-2075; and in scenario High 
immigration, slow convergence applies and the ratio reaches 1 in 2100. We do not assume 
fertility divergence as the past trends speak for narrowing fertility differentials. 
For the fertility rates of Muslims we made one modification. Fertility in this group is 
largely driven by the reproductive behaviour of foreign-born women, who are majority. 
As we further show in the discussion section, foreign-born Muslim women have much 
higher fertility rates compared to native-born Muslims. Very importantly, research 
consistently shows that immigrants who have recently arrived to the country tend to have 
high fertility rates in the first years upon arrival (Wolf 2014; Toulemon 2004). This is 
because couples tend to postpone childbearing to after migration and have the children 
they intended to have once they settle in the new country, but also because some female 
27 The other two fertility scenarios are more hypothetical and illustrate what would happen if TFRs in Austria 
increased to replacement level (around 2 children) by 2100 (Fertilitätsvariante) or what would happen if the 
TFRs declined to mere 1.1 children per woman by 2100 (a level never recorded in Austria previously even 
during the initial stages of fertility postponement that generally leads to suppressed TFR; Alterungsszenario). 
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immigrants arrive to the country through family reunification to join their husbands and 
newly married couples tend to have children in the first years after marriage. Austria has 
witnessed significant numbers of newly arrived young Muslim immigrants, especially 
among the asylum seekers, in 2015 and 2016. Therefore we think that the increased 
numbers of Muslim women in 2011-2015 have depressed overall Muslim TFR to 2.26 
children per women in 2011-2015 period. TFR is a measure sensitive to abrupt changes in 
the size or composition of women of childbearing age and with sudden increase in female 
population TFR would decline not because reproductive behaviour of women changes, 
but purely because of the change in the size of female population (see more detailed 
explanation in the Fertility –data and method section). To test the effect of the size of the 
female population on the TFR for this period, we have computed a hypothetical value. In 
this computation birth to Muslim women in 2011-2015 are related to Muslim women of 
childbearing age who were resident in Austria and we excluded immigrant Muslim 
women who arrived during 2011-2015. In the absence of migration, the TFR of Muslim 
women would be 2.53 children per woman for the same period, compared to 2.26 children 
if we also include recent immigrants. Because it is likely that these newly arrived women 
will have children in the following years, the TFR of Muslims in Austria can actually 
increase in the near future and we model this for the first projection period 2016-2020. 
Therefore, we have adjusted the initial TFR for Muslim women in 2011-2015 in the 
projections to the hypothetical one that is an average of the observed value (2.26) and the 
one in the absence of migration (2.53). The value stands at 2.4 for Austria and we use this 
value to model the fertility differential to the overall TFR in our scenarios. This results in 
temporary fertility increase followed by decline through convergence towards the overall 
fertility through naturalization and increased share of native-born Muslim women in the 
later projection years. As a result, TFR of Muslims bounces upwards in 2016-2020 and 
subsequently declines in all fertility scenarios. 
As mentioned previously, the recent increase in TFR in Austria is linked to the 
recuperation – a catching up effect that results in increasing fertility among women 30+. 
The main fertility scenario of Statistik Austria that we have adopted expects this trend to 
continue. Therefore, we are modelling this postponement effect in two of our scenarios – 
the fast convergence and trend scenario – by converging fertility age pattern towards the 
oldest observed one in 2011-2015 period. Consequently, fertility curves converge to those 
of Protestant women and for protestant women, the age pattern stays the same as in 2011-
2015. In the slow convergence scenario the fertility age pattern stays as in 2011-2015. 
To sum up, the three fertility scenarios use the same target TFR values for the whole of 
Austria and they differ in the pace of fertility convergence. The convergence assumption 
results in fertility decline among Muslims, and fertility increase for all other religious 
groups. 
Fast convergence scenario results in lowest fertility levels for Muslims and highest 
TFRs for other religious groups. It is linked to the Closed border scenario. In this scenario 
fewer new immigrants arrive to Austria by 2016 compared to other scenarios, and even 
from within them, a larger share arrives from low fertility countries. With fewer new 
immigrants, and significantly fewer from predominantly Muslim societies, and a higher 
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share of native-born Muslims, the TFR of Muslims declines at the most rapid pace to 1.71 
children per woman in 2041-2045 (Figure 28). In spite of the initial increase due to 
increased numbers of births to the Muslim immigrants who arrived in 2011-2015, the TFR 
of Muslim reaches the replacement level in 2026-2031. 
Slow convergence scenario is paired with high immigration scenario in Austria. In this 
narrative high numbers of immigrants keep arriving in the following years and among 
them, the share of Muslims is highest compared to the other scenarios. Moreover, some of 
the sending countries of Muslim immigrants are among the high fertility ones. 
Consequently, fertility rates of Muslims remain way above the replacement level by 2050, 
as they are fuelled by increased fertility of the new immigrants with preference for larger 
families. Muslim TFR increase remains at about 2.4 until 2025, and then slowly declines to 
2.22 in 2041-45 (i.e. only a little bit below the 2011-2015 level). Fertility increases slightly 
among predominantly native-born women of Roman Catholic and Protestant faith and 
among the unaffiliated, but remains at about 1.5 children per woman by 2050 (see Figure 
29). 
Medium convergence scenario is linked to the medium migration scenarios (scenario 
European mobility and scenario Diversity). Fertility rates for the religious groups are in 
between the two more extreme scenarios. Fertility of Muslim women first increases to 
almost 2.4, and then declines more rapidly compared to the previous scenario. It drops 
below the replacement level 2041-2045 (2.04). TFR of Roman Catholic women rises up to 
1.53 children per woman, with the TFRs of unaffiliated (1.51) and Protestant women (1.50) 
at a very similar level. Thus, due to small differences in fertility among the Christian 
groups and the unaffiliated, only Muslim women stand out in all scenarios (see Figure 
30). 
 
Figure 28: TFRs for the religious groups in Austria according to the Fast convergence 
scenario  
 
Source: authors’ calculations; Note: The TFR of women with Other religions is not represented in the figure as 
its residual nature leads to an irregular pattern of change. 
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Figure 29: TFRs for the religious groups in Austria according to the Slow convergence 
scenario  
Source: authors’ calculations; Note: The TFR of women with Other religions is not represented in the figure as 
its residual nature leads to an irregular pattern of change. 
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Figure 30: TFRs for the religious groups in Austria according to the Medium convergence 
scenario  
Source: authors’ calculations; Note: The TFR of women with Other religions is not represented in the figure as 
its residual nature leads to an irregular pattern of change. 
 
4.3.2. Vienna 
For the Federal States the population projection of Statistik Austria considers only the 
main fertility scenario and the TFR in Vienna is expected to increase to 1.55 children per 
woman in 2100. The expected future TFRs for the respective religious groups were 
generated in the same way as for Austria, just using different target values. The same 
modification was made to model Muslim TFRs. In Vienna the observed TFR in 2011-2015 
was 2.16 and this was replaced by the hypothetical one without migration, which was at 
2.45 children per woman. The average of 2.30 was used for the convergence scenarios. The 
same procedure was applied to take into account the ageing of fertility pattern, and again 
the schedule for Protestant women was adopted.  
The three fertility scenarios with differing convergence assumptions follow the same 
logic as explained earlier for Austria. However, due to initial differences we can see a 
larger disparity between the fertility of Protestant and Roman Catholic and unaffiliated 
women (see Figure 31, Figure 32 and Figure 33). The fertility of Muslim women in Vienna 
increases only slightly in 2016-2020 in the fast convergence scenario, and falls below the 
replacement level already in 2021-2025 in the fast convergence, in 2031-35 in the trend 
scenario, and in 2041-45 in the slow convergence alternative.  
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Figure 31: TFRs for the religious groups in Vienna according to the Fast convergence 
scenario  
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
Figure 32: TFRs for the religious groups in Vienna according to the Slow convergence 
scenario  
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
2001-2005 2006-2010 2011-2015 2016-2020 2021-2025 2026-2030 2031-2035 2036-2040 2041-2045
Total Roman Catholic Protestant Muslim
None Orthodox Other
64 
 
Figure 33: TFRs for the religious groups in Vienna according to the Medium convergence 
scenario  
Source: authors’ calculations 
 
4.4. Secularisation 
Secularisation rates were estimated for 2011-2015 based on the available data. In the 
scenarios European mobility and Diversity, we assume that the secularisation rates remain 
constant until the end of the projection period, whereas in the low secularisation scenario 
(applied in scenario High immigration), we assume a general decrease (-10% per period) 
until 2026-31, and then the rates stay constant. In the high secularisation scenario 
(implemented under scenario Low immigration), we assume a general increase (+10% per 
period) until 2026-2031 and then the rates are kept constant until the end of the projection 
period. These assumptions are also applied to the secularisation rates of Orthodox and 
Muslim population.  
 
4.5. Mortality 
Another component of the projections to 2046 is age-and sex-specific mortality from 2016 
to 2046. Mortality is based on the medium scenario of Statistik Austria, whereby life 
expectancy at birth increases to 84 years for men and 88 years for women by 2041-2045. 
Mortality is the same across all scenarios.  
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5. Results 
5.1. European Mobility Scenario 
5.1.1. Austria 
Scenario European mobility illustrates a future in which migration processes return to past 
trends that were observed in the years 2006 to 2010, when migration flows were mainly 
composed of Europeans. Concerning other drivers of religious change, the scenario 
assumes medium secularisation and medium fertility.  
Compared with 2016, the share of Roman Catholics would decrease from 64% to 45% in 
2046 primarily due to the declining share in net-migration as well as continuing 
secularisation. In parallel, the group of the religiously unaffiliated would increase from 
17% in 2016 to 25% in 2046. Both the share of Muslims (from 8% to 14%) and the share of 
Orthodox (from 5% to 9%) would grow in this scenario, while the share of Protestants 
(5%) and Others (2%) would remain constant (see Figure 34).  
 
Figure 34: Scenario European mobility: Religious distribution of Austria`s population in 
2016 and 2046 
  
 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
5.1.2. Vienna 
This scenario refers to a situation where international migration flows are mostly 
composed of migrants from the European Union. Despite the predominantly European 
immigration flow, the share of Roman Catholics in the Viennese population is projected to 
decline to 24% in 2046 primarily due to the declining share in net-migration as a result of 
CAT PRO ORT MUS OTH NOR 
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increasing outward movement from Vienna. The share of the population who is 
unaffiliated would decrease slightly to 29% as both a result of the migration of the 
unaffiliated and the saturation of secularisation. The share of the Muslims is projected to 
increase to 21% and that of the Orthodox to 16% in 2046. The results of this scenario are 
summarized in Figure 35.  
 
Figure 35: Scenario European mobility: Religious distribution of Vienna’s population in 
2016 and 2046 
  
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
5.2. Diversity scenario 
5.2.1. Austria 
Scenario Diversity takes into account current trends of migration processes that are 
characterised by a strong non-European component. Just as scenario European mobility, 
scenario Diversity assumes medium secularisation and medium fertility. Figure 36 shows 
that the Roman Catholics would experience a strong decline from 64% in 2016 to 45% in 
2046, while again the share of Protestants would decline only from 5% to 4%. The biggest 
increase once again would be attributed to the Muslims; their share would rise from 8% in 
2016 to 17% in 2046. Compared to other religious groups, the religiously unaffiliated 
register the second-largest increase from 17% to 24%. The share of Orthodox would rise 
also from 5% to 9%. The share of Others would remain stable with 2%. 
 
CAT PRO ORT MUS OTH NOR 
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Figure 36: Scenario Diversity: Religious distribution of Austria’s population in 2016 and 
2046 
   
 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
5.2.2. Vienna 
This scenario is particularly interesting in the sense that it shows the sensitivity of the 
projections to migration, especially the effect of the reference period as a basis for 
projecting migration trends. When we take into consideration the trend that was observed 
in the last five years – with a large share of migrants arriving from countries outside of the 
EU – we see that while this would not affect much the share of the Roman Catholics and 
the unaffiliated, it would change considerably the share of the Viennese population with a 
Muslim affiliation: 23% in 2046 compared to 21% in scenario European mobility and to 14% 
in 2016. The share of the Orthodox would increase by about 5 percentage points to 15% in 
2046 (see Figure 37)  
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Figure 37: Scenario Diversity: Religious distribution of Vienna’s population in 2016 and 
2046 
  
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
5.3. Low Immigration Scenario 
5.3.1. Austria 
Scenario Low immigration is based on the idea that international migration comes to halt 
by 2021 as Austria closes its border. Such a scenario means that changes in the religious 
landscape are foremost attributed to secularisation and fertility assumptions. The scenario 
assumes strong secularisation, diminishing fertility differentials and fast decline of 
Muslim fertility below the replacement level. Figure 38 illustrates the development of the 
religious composition of Austria’s population under these assumptions. In comparison 
with 2016, the highest proportional increase would be attributed to No Religion (from 
17% to 28%), while the strongest decrease would be seen for Roman Catholics (from 64% 
to 47%). This scenario features, on the one hand, the lowest decline in the share of Roman 
Catholics across all the four scenarios and, on the other hand, the lowest increase of 
population with a Muslim or Orthodox affiliation: The share of Muslims would increase 
from 8% to 12% and the share of Orthodox would rise from 5% to 6%. The share of 
Protestants decreases slightly from 5% to 4%; the share of Others remains stable with 2%.  
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69 
 
Figure 38: Scenario Low immigration: Religious distribution of Austria’s population in 
2016 and 2046 
   
 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
 
5.3.2. Vienna 
According to this scenario, which reduces international migration to Austria substantially, 
the population in Vienna would be the lowest among all scenarios, and it would be the 
closest to the present one in terms of distribution by religion. The secularisation trend 
would still affect the Roman Catholic group, which would decline to 26% in 2046 (from 
35% in 2016) (see Figure 39). The group of unaffiliated would increase to 31%. The 
increase is not as important as expected because many inhabitants of Vienna who become 
unaffiliated also move out of Vienna to other Federal States. As for Austria, this scenario 
shows the lowest increase in terms of population with a Muslim affiliation, with 20% in 
2046 (from 14% in 2016); the same is true for the Orthodox, their share increases to 12% of 
the Viennese population in 2046 (from 10% in 2016).  
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Figure 39: Scenario Low immigration: Religious distribution of Vienna’s population in 
2016 and 2046 
  
 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
 
5.4. High Immigration Scenario 
5.4.1. Austria 
High immigration scenario depicts a future in which the population growth is characterised 
by high international migration flows, especially from the Middle East and North Africa 
and from sub-Saharan countries. High immigration from the countries with generally less 
secularised societies compared to Austria leads to higher levels of religiosity and to a 
trend reversal in secularisation. Due to constant influx of high volumes of new migrants, 
many of whom come from high-fertility countries, the scenario only slowly assumes  
converging fertility levels and fertility of Muslims remains above replacement until 2046.  
Under these assumptions, Austria would see a rapid increase of Muslim population as 
the share of Muslims increases from 8% in 2016 to 21% in 2046 (see Figure 40). The reasons 
lie in the positive net-migration and the relatively high fertility. The share of Roman 
Catholics would decline strongly from 64% in 2016 to 42% in 2046, while the share 
Protestants would remain stable by 5%. Both the share of unaffiliated (from 17% to 21%) 
and Orthodox (from 5% to 8%) would rise. The share of Others would remain constant by 
about 2%.  
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Figure 40: High immigration: Religious distribution of Austria’s population in 2016 and 
2046 
   
 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
5.4.2. Vienna 
Vienna, a city attracting the most international migrants coming to Austria, would 
increase importantly in size under this scenario and would have around 2.4 million 
inhabitants by 2046. The share of Muslims is projected to increase from 14% in 2016 to 
30% – the highest increase across the four scenarios. While the share of Roman Catholics 
would decrease in this scenario from 35% in 2016 to 22% in 2046, the share of Protestants 
(from 4% to 5%) and of Orthodox (from 10% to 13%) is projected to increase. The expected 
higher levels of religiosity would lead to a trend reversal in secularisation, resulting in a 
decline of the unaffiliated by about 6 percentage points (from 30% in 2016 to 24% in 2046). 
The share of Others would slightly decrease from 6% to 5%. Figure 41 summarizes the 
development of the religious composition of Vienna’s population under the assumptions 
made.  
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Figure 41: Scenario High immigration – Religious distribution of Vienna’s population in 
2016 and 2046 
  
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
  
 
6. Austria: Summary 
The projected future population size varies significantly across the four scenarios (see 
Figure 42). In Low immigration scenario the population of Austria is shrinking after 2026 as 
a result of limited international migration flows. In contrast, the population increases by 
almost 21% between 2016 and 2046 in High immigration scenario, which assumes the 
largest net migration and highest fertility with no convergence among the religious 
groups. In the scenarios European mobility and Diversity, Austria’s population would 
increase by about 12%-11% until 2046. According to our estimates, the population would 
range between 8.5 million in Low immigration scenario and 10.5 million in High immigration 
scenario. In the latter large movements of migrants from MENA and SSA countries would 
arrive to Austria and significantly diversify the religious landscape of Vienna in 
particular.  
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Figure 42: Austria –- Total population 2001-2046 according to the four scenarios  
 
 
 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 
European 
mobility 8,020,946 8,219,790 8,337,812 8,662,193 8,996,222 9,234,942 9,409,825 9,538,568 9,633,184 9,704,503 
Diversity 8,020,946 8,219,790 8,337,812 8,662,193 8,996,228 9,230,351 9,394,325 9,507,877 9,586,560 9,642,689 
Low 
immigration 8,020,946 8,219,790 8,337,812 8,662,193 8,918,466 8,936,854 8,911,868 8,832,551 8,705,184 8,546,064 
High 
immigration 
8,020,946 8,219,790 8,337,812 8,662,193 9,140,802 9,515,909 9,818,199 10,068,714 10,283,757 10,476,283 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
One interesting aspect is that the total population number is higher in the scenario 
European mobility than in Diversity scenario, where migration is more strongly driven by 
non-European migration flow and Muslim migrants respectively. At first glance, this 
seems somewhat surprising given that fertility of Muslim women is higher compared to 
native women, but looking in more detail we see that European migration – based on the 
trend observed in the period 2006-2010 – is predominately female resulting in higher 
numbers of births.  
It is not surprising that our results do not differ much from those of the Statistik 
Austria (2016), since their assumptions serve as basis for ours on the volume of migration, 
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level of fertility and future mortality. However, the differences point out the importance 
of population composition, and highlight especially the consequences of the composition 
of migration flows.  
Not just the overall population size differs in the four scenarios, but also the size of the 
religious groups. To give an example, different trajectories of the projected size of Muslim 
population in all four scenarios are depicted in Figure 44 and can be compared to the 
trends for the overall population size in Figure 43. Based on the assumptions made, we 
find on one end of the spectrum values for the Low immigration scenario with the smallest 
Muslim population that would not exceed 12% of the total population in 2046, and on the 
other end High immigration with the highest number and share of Muslim population as a 
result of the projected increase of immigrants from MENA and SSA countries (21% in 
2046). The size of Muslim population would range between 1.1 million and 2.2 million. 
Table 3 provides the results for the other scenarios in terms of distribution of all religious 
groups. Apart from Muslims, most affiliations are influenced less substantially by the 
projections, as can be seen from the share of the Roman Catholics (within a range of 42-
47% in 2046) and the unaffiliated (within a range of 21-28% in 2046) depending on the 
scenario. 
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Figure 43: Austria – Absolute numbers of Muslims 2001-2046 according to the four 
scenarios  
 
 
 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 
European mobility 346,502 447,596 518,615 686,599 805,769 915,384 1,021,156 1,125,242 1,227,292 1,327,723 
Diversity 346,502 447,596 518,615 686,599 855,689 1,011,812 1,162,264 1,310,624 1,457,837 1,605,198 
Low immigration 346,502 447,596 518,615 686,599 846,931 90,5791 957,500 1,000,887 1,035,664 1,062,201 
High immigration 346,502 447,596 518,615 686,599 988,047 1,253,427 1,506,985 1,755,541 200,0611 2,247,777 
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Figure 44: Austria – Share of Muslim population according to the six scenarios  
 
 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 
European mobility 4% 5% 6% 8% 9% 10% 11% 12% 13% 14% 
Diversity 4% 5% 6% 8% 10% 11% 12% 14% 15% 17% 
Low immigration 4% 5% 6% 8% 9% 10% 11% 11% 12% 12% 
High immigration 4% 5% 6% 8% 11% 13% 15% 17% 19% 21% 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
Results in Table 3 show interesting differences in the religious composition across 
different ages. This is because migrants are usually younger and more religiously diverse 
than the resident population and we can expect an increased share of young adults (20-34) 
among them. Therefore, religious groups with a strong migrant component have a 
younger population. If we look at population younger than 20 years, we can see that the 
share of persons aged 0-19 is higher among Muslims compared to the total population: 21-
25% in European mobility and Diversity, compared to 14-17% among the total population. 
This is a result of migration as well as higher fertility of Muslims compared to other 
groups. In contrast, the share of elderly people (65+) is higher among the Roman Catholics 
compared with the other religious groups. We can say that Muslims are the youngest and 
Roman Catholics the oldest religious groups in terms of their age composition.  
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Table 3: Religious distribution of Austria’s population by broad age groups in 2016 and 
2046 according to the different scenarios 
 
 
CAT PRO ORT MUS OTH NOR 
2016 
Total 
Population 
64% 5% 5% 8% 2% 17% 
0-20 62% 4% 6% 15% 2% 10% 
20-64 60% 4% 5% 9% 2% 21% 
65+ 70% 7% 2% 2% 1% 19% 
2046 - European 
mobility 
Total 
Population 
45% 5% 9% 14% 2% 25% 
0-20 39% 5% 12% 21% 3% 20% 
20-64 39% 4% 9% 16% 2% 29% 
65+ 58% 7% 4% 6% 1% 23% 
2046 - Diversity 
Total 
Population 
45% 4% 9% 17% 2% 24% 
0-20 38% 4% 11% 25% 3% 19% 
20-64 37% 3% 9% 22% 2% 27% 
65+ 58% 7% 4% 7% 1% 23% 
2046 - Low 
immigration  
Total 
Population 
47% 4% 6% 12% 2% 28% 
0-20 45% 3% 7% 17% 2% 25% 
20-64 39% 3% 7% 16% 2% 34% 
65+ 57% 7% 4% 7% 1% 23% 
2046 - High 
immigration  
Total 
Population 
42% 5% 8% 21% 2% 21% 
0-20 35% 4% 10% 31% 3% 16% 
20-64 35% 4% 8% 29% 2% 21% 
65+ 58% 7% 4% 7% 1% 23% 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
 
 
7. Vienna: Summary 
The population of Vienna would increase in three out of four scenarios. It would decline 
under the conditions of the Low immigration scenario that would greatly limit and later 
completely diminish international migration (see Figure 45). The lack of international 
immigrants that would contribute to Vienna’s population is further exacerbated by losses 
due to internal migration. If international migration flows came to a halt, the population 
size would remain relatively stable at about 1.8 million by 2046. 
The increase in the city’s population would be particularly acute in the case of the High 
immigration scenario according to which it would reach 2.4 million in 2046. This would 
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represent an increase of 33% compared to 2016. On the other hand, Goujon et al. (2014) 
have demonstrated that migration was the key factor shaping Vienna’s population size 
already in the past and found that in absence of migration between 1971 and 2013, the 
city’s population would have dropped to mere 1.2 million instead of 1.7 million in 2013. 
The two different trend migration scenarios implemented under European mobility and 
Diversity would entail a population between 2.1 and 2.2 million, which is close to the 
projections results of Statistik Austria (2016) for the medium variant. 
 
Figure 45: Vienna –Total population 2001-2046 according to the four scenarios  
 
 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 
European 
mobility 1,553,951 1,641,746 1,689,109 1,826,222 1,950,687 2,027,576 2,078,005 2,112,662 2,136,846 2,156,963 
Diversity 1,553,951 1,641,746 1,689,109 1,826,222 1,950,685 2,025,768 2,071,718 2,099,268 2,114,317 2,123,907 
Low 
immigration 1,553,951 1,641,746 1,689,109 1,826,222 1,912,538 1,923,653 1,921,421 1,902,075 1,866,448 1,820,675 
High 
immigration 1,553,951 1,641,746 1,689,109 1,826,222 2,007,005 2,136,489 2,233,353 2,308,930 2,370,924 2,427,817 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
As was shown in the case of Austria, most of the variation in the religious composition 
would occur with the absolute number and the share of the Muslim population (see 
Figure 46 and Figure 47). The Muslim population is more visible in the city of Vienna, also 
because other religions are less represented in the population compared to the whole of 
Austria, with the share of the unaffiliated being particularly high. In 2046, there could be 
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between 360 and 730 thousands of Muslims residing in the city of Vienna. Vienna’s 
Muslim population would be the largest under the assumptions of High migration scenario 
with large migration flows originating mostly from the Middle East and North Africa and 
sub-Saharan countries and under the condition of persisting high fertility of Muslim 
women – in that case, the number of Muslims would almost triple compared with 2016 
and the share of Muslims would increase to 30% by 2046. In contrast, Muslim population 
would be the least sizeable if international migration came to a halt during the projection 
period (scenario Low immigration). This scenario would still result in an increase of the 
share of Muslims to 20% in 2046. Similarly to the results for Austria, the two trend 
scenarios (European mobility and Diversity) result in very different group sizes and a 
different share of Muslim population in Vienna. Should Vienna follow the migration 
trend observed in the most recent period (2011-2015), the share of Muslims would 
increase to 23% in the city of Vienna, whereas a pursuit of the trend that was prevalent in 
2006-2010, with more European than non-European composing the international 
migration flows, would mean a share of Muslims of about 21%.  
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Figure 46: Vienna – Absolute numbers of Muslims 2001-2046 according to the four 
scenarios  
 
 
2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 
European 
mobility 121,439 166,830 197,105 259,894 303,776 339,188 370,213 398,679 425,288 449,829 
Diversity 121,439 166,830 197,105 259,894 311,392 353,062 389,735 423,109 453,993 482,541 
Low 
immigration 121,439 166,830 197,105 259,894 306,198 326,555 342,760 354,514 361,766 364,823 
High 
immigration 
121,439 166,830 197,105 259,894 362,586 447,765 525,009 597,117 665,570 732,876 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
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Figure 47: Vienna – Share of Muslims population according to the four scenarios  
 
 2001 2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 
European mobility 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 17% 18% 19% 20% 21% 
Diversity 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 17% 19% 20% 21% 23% 
Low immigration 8% 10% 12% 14% 16% 17% 18% 19% 19% 20% 
High immigration 8% 10% 12% 14% 18% 21% 24% 26% 28% 30% 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
 
Contrary to what we have seen in the case of Austria, the population of the religiously 
unaffiliated strongly varies in the four scenarios. Table 4 shows that the share of the 
unaffiliated could be as low as 24% in 2046 (High immigration scenario) and as high as 31% 
(Low immigration scenario). Diversification of the religious landscape through intense 
migration results in a declining share of the unaffiliated because most international 
immigrants are religiously affiliated. This is partly an effect of our assumptions because 
we assume the same religious composition of these immigrants as there was in their 
country of origin in 2010, i.e. we do not take into account projected religious compositions 
in these countries that may be different in nearly 50 years from now if secularisation 
spreads in these countries.  
As shown for Austria, the religious composition of the population of Vienna varies 
across age groups. Scenario High immigration, with very high migration and slow 
transition of fertility for the Muslim group, leads to a situation where 43% of the 
population under the age of 20 would be Muslim in Vienna. Under the trend scenarios 
European mobility and Diversity, the share of the Muslim population in the younger age 
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group would be between 30% and 33%, and thus still largely above the share in the total 
population (21%-23%).  
 
Table 4: Religious distribution of Vienna’s population by broad age groups in 2016 and 
2046 according to the different scenarios 
  CAT PRO ORT MUS OTH NOR 
2016 Total Population 35% 4% 10% 14% 6% 30% 
 0-20 35% 4% 12% 26% 6% 17% 
20-64 31% 4% 11% 15% 7% 33% 
65+ 31% 7% 5% 4% 7% 47% 
2046 – 
European 
mobility 
Total Population 24% 5% 16% 21% 6% 29% 
 0-20 22% 4% 18% 30% 5% 21% 
20-64 24% 4% 15% 21% 5% 31% 
65+ 21% 8% 10% 12% 8% 40% 
2046 – 
Diversity 
Total Population 24% 4% 15% 23% 6% 28% 
 0-20 21% 3% 17% 33% 5% 21% 
20-64 24% 3% 15% 24% 5% 29% 
65+ 21% 8% 9% 13% 9% 40% 
2046 – Low 
immigration  
Total Population 26% 4% 12% 20% 6% 31% 
 0-20 28% 3% 8% 27% 5% 28% 
20-64 24% 3% 14% 21% 6% 32% 
65+ 24% 8% 12% 14% 8% 35% 
2046 – High 
immigration  
Total Population 22% 5% 13% 30% 5% 24% 
 0-20  19% 4% 14% 43% 4% 16% 
20-64 22% 6% 12% 34% 5% 22% 
65+ 20% 8% 9% 17% 8% 38% 
Source: Statistik Austria and authors’ calculations 
CAT = Roman Catholics, PRO = Protestants, ORT = Orthodox, MUS = Muslims, OTH = other religions, NOR = no religion 
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8. Discussion and Conclusion 
While the projections demonstrate some of the possible futures that Austria and its capital 
city could experience in the coming decades, and those are all quite dissimilar, they also 
show that religious diversity is bound to increase, and there are no reasons to think that 
any of the trends that have been in place already for several decades in the country will 
stop and that the country would move back to the situation of the early 1970s. Religious 
homogeneity will be diminishing. The report demonstrates that the split between 
religiously affiliated and unaffiliated population will be less and less relevant and that it 
is more the co-existence of different religious groups that will require the attention of the 
different stakeholders, both at the national and at the capital city level. This is in line with 
the post-secular theory. 
The Austrian situation and that of its capital city are not unique in Europe, and most 
Western European countries are currently going through similar experiences. Europe’s 
religious landscape is going through profound transformations that have been referred to 
as a soft revolution (Goujon et al. 2014; Goujon and Bauer 2015). Revolution because it 
affects Christianity, which has long been considered the “foundation of a common 
European identity” (Halman and Riis 2003, p. 1) and soft because it is neither violent or 
sudden, nor is it an organized movement but rather a development that progresses 
gradually but surely through different societal mechanisms. On the one hand, many 
Europeans have a low sense of religious belonging, having become secularised or turned 
towards other forms of spirituality. On the other hand, religious diversity is on the rise, as 
many European countries have become major receivers of often religiously different 
international immigrants during the last decades. The increasing stock of international 
migrants, including second and further generations, is the main driver of socio-
demographic, cultural, ethnic and religious diversity in destination countries, where new 
arrivals have come with an array of religious denominations that were previously often 
just marginal or non-existent. 
The growth of minority religions is not solely driven by immigration but also by the 
relatively strong demographic momentum of particular migrant groups with youthful age 
structures and high fertility rates (see also Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014). Immigrants 
and people belonging to minority religions tend to have a higher level of religious 
intensity in order to strengthen their self-identity, but also they often come from countries 
where religion remains important in shaping the social life and levels of religiosity in 
terms of beliefs and practice. At the same time, descendants of immigrants show a general 
convergence towards the religious intensity and demographic behaviour of the host 
society (Inglehart and Norris 2009). However, such secularisation trends are less 
pronounced among some groups, and a revival of religiosity has been documented within 
certain second- or third-generation Muslim communities (e.g. Simon and Tiberj 2016; 
Maliepaard, Gijsberts and Lubbers 2012). 
As for the differences in demographic behaviour, and particularly regarding fertility, it 
is not all about religion. While the positive relationship between religious intensity, family 
size, and fertility has been well documented (and also holds among the Christians who 
84 
 
are native to the country) (Baudin 2015, Berghammer 2012, Philipov and Berghammer 
2007, Adsera 2006), belonging to a religious groups does not predict fertility outcomes. 
Other socio-cultural and socio-economic characteristics, such as nativity status (recent 
immigrants tend to have more children), educational attainment (less educated having 
larger families) or female labour force participation (full-time employed women having 
smaller families) may be underlying factors of high fertility in some religious groups, in 
particular in those with a predominantly immigrant background (for Muslims see 
Stonawski et al. 2015). Muslims in Austria are not an exception and the evidence from 
census 2001 shows a) that educational gradient in fertility also holds for Muslim women 
(Figure 48), b) that native-born Muslim women have a lower lifetime fertility compared to 
foreign-born ones (Figure 49), and c) that there is a large diversity in fertility outcomes of 
Muslim women of various origins (Figure 49). To sum up, fertility of Muslim women in 
Austria is high because many have low education and come from countries with higher 
fertility ideals. However, those Muslim women who are highly educated have similar 
fertility outcomes as highly educated Roman Catholic women in Austria (Figure 49). 
Thus, if the new generations of Muslims in Austria achieve higher education and social 
status, we can expect that they will also have smaller families.  
Figure 48: Educational differences in completed fertility28 of women of various religious 
groups, Austria 2001 
 
Source: census 2001, authors` calculations 
Note: Educational attainment: low – Pflichtschule or lower (ISCED 2 or lower); medium – some secondary 
education (ISCED 3); high – completed university, kolleg or FH (ISCED 4, 5 or higher). 
 
28 Completed fertility is synonymous with lifetime fertility. It is an average number of children per women of 
a given group at the age of 40-54. The fertility of women older than 40 is very low, so we can consider women 
at that age to have completed their childbearing. 
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Nativity status and country of origin play a big role, too. Muslim women born in 
Austria have much lower fertility than their counterparts of immigrant origin (Figure 49). 
This is in line with the findings of studies from other countries that show convergence of 
second generation immigrants towards the fertility levels common among the host 
population (Kulu and González-Ferrer 2014). Recent immigrants tend to have higher 
fertility, also because they may come from societies and settings where larger families are 
common and highly valued. Most Muslims in Austria are of Turkish origin, and we can 
see that Turkish have the highest fertility outcomes among Muslims in Austria (and they 
also tend to have low education as many came as guest workers and were integrated into 
the working class social strata). In contrast, Iranian women had a fertility about as high as 
the average for all women of the same generation in Austria, namely about 1.8 children. 
 
Figure 49: Completed fertility of women of various religious groups and Muslim women 
of selected origins by education, Austria 2001 
 
Source: census 2001, authors’ calculations 
 
This means that with increasing education, integration and with fewer immigrants 
from high fertility countries, we can expect fertility of Muslim women to continue its 
downward trend. 
Historically, religious belief and affiliation to religious groups and communities were 
the cornerstones of societal relations. While religion has been at the inception of many 
conflicts, there is at the same time a rich tradition of coexistence of diverse religions in 
Europe. This is especially the case in cities and urban areas, which have always been, and 
still are, hubs of migration and places of social and cultural change (Murphey 1954). 
Today, European capitals and major cities are at the forefront of both secularisation (Cox 
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2013; Norris and Inglehart 2004) and post-secular tendencies with the re-emergence of 
religiosity (Beaumont and Baker 2011; Habermas 2008) as well as the growing visibility of 
religions in the public space (Oosterbaan 2014; Finke and Stark 2000), including issues of 
various forms of segregation (Catney 2016). According to Beaumont and Baker (2011, p.1), 
“rapidly diversifying urban locations are the best places to witness the emergence of new 
spaces in which religions and spiritual traditions are creating both new alliances but also 
bifurcations with secular concepts.” 
In the public debate, religious diversity is often considered as a constraint for the 
peaceful coexistence of, and dialogue among, different communities and social groups 
(Carol and Koopmans 2013), particularly so if secularism is seen as one of the core values 
and rules of conduct in European societies, with religion broadly perceived as private. 
The polarizing trends of increased religious pluralism and religiosity on the one side and 
ongoing secularisation on the other side are shaping the diverse religious landscape of 
Europe (Knippenberg 2005), as well as the global environment in terms of national 
policies and international settings (see Beaumont and Baker 2011; Gale and Naylor 2002).  
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10.  Annex 
The results of the reconstruction and of the projections according to different scenarios for Austria and 
Vienna are based on authors` calculations and Statistik Austria data. 
10.1. Results for Austria 
European mobility scenario Absolute Numbers Share 
2001 Roman Catholics 6,025,623 75% 
Protestants 383,026 5% 
Orthodox 183,187 2% 
Muslims 346,502 4% 
Other religions 100,856 1% 
No religion 981,752 12% 
Total Population 8,020,946  
2016 Roman Catholics 5,563,551 64% 
Protestants 412,423 5% 
Orthodox 397,219 5% 
Muslims 686,599 8% 
Other religions 142,062 2% 
No religion 1,460,339 17% 
Total Population 8,662,193  
2046 
 
Roman Catholics 4,357,037 45% 
Protestants 508,755 5% 
Orthodox 888,988 9% 
Muslims 1,327,723 14% 
Other religions 236,236 2% 
No religion 2,385,764 25% 
Total Population 9,704,503  
 
Diversity scenario Absolute Numbers Share 
2001 Roman Catholics 6,025,623 75% 
Protestants 383,026 5% 
Orthodox 183,187 2% 
Muslims 346,502 4% 
Other religions 100,856 1% 
No religion 981,752 12% 
Total Population 8,020,946  
2016 Roman Catholics 5,563,551 64% 
Protestants 412,423 5% 
Orthodox 397,219 5% 
Muslims 686,599 8% 
Other religions 142,062 2% 
No religion 1,460,339 17% 
Total Population 8,662,193  
2046 
 
Roman Catholics 4,293,842 45% 
Protestants 416,900 4% 
Orthodox 828,587  9% 
Muslims 1,605,198 17% 
Other religions 230,182 2% 
No religion 2,267,980 24% 
Total Population 9,642,689  
 
 
 
Low immigration scenario Absolute Numbers Share 
2001 Roman Catholics 6,025,623 75% 
Protestants 383,026 5% 
Orthodox 183,187 2% 
Muslims 346,502 4% 
Other religions 100,856 1% 
No religion 981,752 12% 
Total Population 8,020,946  
2016 Roman Catholics 5,563,551 64% 
Protestants 412,423 5% 
Orthodox 397,219 5% 
Muslims 686,599 8% 
Other religions 142,062 2% 
No religion 1,460,339 17% 
   
2046 Roman Catholics 4,033,780 47% 
Protestants 356,901 4% 
Orthodox 541,008 6% 
Muslims 1,062,201 12% 
Other religions 174,602 2% 
No religion 2,377,572 28% 
Total Population 8,546,064  
 
High immigration scenario Absolute Numbers Share 
2001 Roman Catholics 6,025,623 75% 
Protestants 383,026 5% 
Orthodox 183,187 2% 
Muslims 346,502 4% 
Other religions 100,856 1% 
No religion 981,752 12% 
Total Population 8,020,946  
2016 Roman Catholics 5,563,551 64% 
Protestants 412,423 5% 
Orthodox 397,219 5% 
Muslims 686,599 8% 
Other religions 142,062 2% 
No religion 1,460,339 17% 
Total Population 8,662,193  
2046 Roman Catholics 4,416,956 42% 
Protestants 526,502 5% 
Orthodox 854,999  8% 
Muslims 2,247,777 21% 
Other religions 261,327 2% 
No religion 2,168,722 21% 
Total Population 10,476,283  
 
10.2. Results for Vienna 
 
European mobility scenario Absolute Numbers Share 
2001 
 
Roman Catholics 764,101 49% 
Protestants 72,699 5% 
Orthodox 93,446 6% 
Muslims 121,439 8% 
Other religions 103,733 7% 
No religion 398,533 26% 
Total Population 1,553,951  
2016 
 
Roman Catholics 634,181 35% 
Protestants 82,049 4% 
Orthodox 189,506 10% 
Muslims 259,894 14% 
Other religions 118,471 6% 
No religion 542,121 30% 
Total Population 1,826,222  
2046 
 
Roman Catholics 522,619 24% 
Protestants 106,056 5% 
Orthodox 342,955  16% 
Muslims 449,829 21% 
Other religions 120,298 6% 
No religion 615,206 29% 
Total Population 2,156,963  
 
Diversity scenario Absolute Numbers Share 
2001 
 
Roman Catholics 764,101 49% 
Protestants 72,699 5% 
Orthodox 93,446 6% 
Muslims 121,439 8% 
Other religions 103,733 7% 
No religion 398,533 26% 
Total Population 1,553,951  
2016 
 
Roman Catholics 634,181 35% 
Protestants 82,049 4% 
Orthodox 189,506 10% 
Muslims 259,894 14% 
Other religions 118,471 6% 
No religion 542,121 30% 
Total Population 1,826,222  
2046 
 
Roman Catholics 512,501 24% 
Protestants 88,300 4% 
Orthodox 324,163  15% 
Muslims 482,541 23% 
Other religions 124,154 6% 
No religion 592,248 28% 
Total Population 2,123,907  
 
 
 
 
Low immigration scenario Absolute Numbers Share 
2001 
 
Roman Catholics 764,101 49% 
Protestants 72,699 5% 
Orthodox 93,446 6% 
Muslims 121,439 8% 
Other religions 103,733 7% 
No religion 398,533 26% 
Total Population 1,553,951  
2016 
 
CAT 634,181 35% 
PRO 82,049 4% 
ORT 189,506 10% 
MUS 259,894 14% 
OTH 118,471 6% 
NOR 542,121 30% 
Total Population 1,826,222  
2046 
 
CAT 480,980 26% 
PRO 78,247 4% 
ORT 217,783  12% 
MUS 364,823  20% 
OTH 110,665 6% 
NOR 568,177 31% 
Total Population 1,820,675  
 
High immigration scenario Absolute Numbers Share 
2001 
 
Roman Catholics 764,101 49% 
Protestants 72,699 5% 
Orthodox 93,446 6% 
Muslims 121,439 8% 
Other religions 103,733 7% 
No religion 398,533 26% 
Total Population 1,553,951  
2016 
 
Roman Catholics 634,181 35% 
Protestants 82,049 4% 
Orthodox 189,506 10% 
Muslims 259,894 14% 
Other religions 118,471 6% 
No religion 542,121 30% 
Total Population 1,826,222  
2046 
 
Roman Catholics 539,145 22% 
Protestants 132,297 5% 
Orthodox 321,442  13% 
Muslims 732,876 30% 
Other religions 129,095 5% 
No religion 572,962 24% 
Total Population 2,427,817  
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